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THE METHODOLOGY OF HUSSERLIAN VS. CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: A HISTORICO-CRITICAL STUDY

PERRY KLEIN

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts

Graduate Programme in Psychology
York University
North York, Ontario

August, 1990

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The Methodology of Husserlian vs. Contemporary Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study

by Perry Klein

a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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Abstract

The methodology of Husserlian phenomenological psychology (HPP) and contemporary phenomenological psychology (CPP) were compared critically. A review of Husserl's works on phenomenological psychology indicated that this discipline was intended to provide an apodictic system of concepts on which to bas. empirical psychology. It was to be an a priori, descriptive, intuitive inquiry into the essences (i.e. necessary, universal structures) of intentional phenomena. A review of 29 contemporary methodological articles revealed that research projects by van Kaam (1958) and Giorgi (1975) in which one or more subjects were queried concerning an experience and the response of each was subjected to qualitative analysis became paradigms for the CPP. A qualitative content analysis of 24 phenomenological psychological articles disclosed four types of methods in current use in phenomenological psychology. In descending order of frequency these were: (1) empirical studies in which the researcher solicited several subjects' accounts of an experience in order to describe its general structure; (2) hermeneutic studies in which the researcher applied various interpretive methods to the speech and gestures accompanying an experience in order to disclose its general structure; (3) traditional Husserlian studies in which the researcher applied free imaginative variation to his or her experience in order to grasp its essence; (4) experimental studies in which the researcher tested a hypothesis derived

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from existential or phenomenological theory using conventional empirical methods. Each of these types of research exemplified a continuity from HPP to CPP in the effort to describe the general structures (essences) of experiences. In empirical, hermeneutic, and traditional CPP there was some continuation of the a priori methods of HPP. However, three major methodological changes have taken place. Compared to HPP, CPP was characterized by: (1) the inclusion of the experience of a group of subjects in addition to that of the researcher; (2) the use of hermeneutic rather than descriptive methods; (3) the use of empirical rather than a priori logic in generalization. Finally, it was argued here that the essentialism (and in some cases, apriorism) of HPP and CPP has not been given an adequate theoretical defence, and that this essentialism is contrary to empirical evidence for cultural variation in experience. Consequently, limitations were proposed concerning the type of phenomena to which current research methods may be applied, and the employment of emic cross-cultural research strategies was recommended.

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Introduction

The task of this thesis is to examine the thematic relationship between Husserlian phenomenological psychology, (hereafter, HPP), and contemporary phenomenological psychology (hereafter, CPP). This comparison will be critical; it is intended to uncover ways in which both what is retained and what has been omitted from HPP within CPP have strengthened or weakened the value of the method. Of particular interest is the use of a priori methods in both HPP and CPP, salient because of the rejection of such methods by modern, positivistic psychology. Also of interest here is essentialism, the assumption that psychological phenomena have universal, necessary structures; this notion is called into question by literature on variations in psychological phenomena across cultures and historical periods.

The domain of the study being proposed here is limited to contemporary North American phenomenological psychology. But phenomenological psychology has other branches than this one. These include: indigenous North American phenomenological psychology, exemplified by the work of Donald Snygg, Robert MacLeod and Carl Rogers; phenomenological and existential-phenomenological psychiatry, such as that of Rollo May and Victor Frankl (Spiegelberg, 1972); and contemporary European research in phenomenological and existential psychology (Van Kaam, 1961).

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Contemporary phenomenological psychology in North America is dominated by what will be referred to here as the "Duquesne School." Features which mark this group of endeavors as a distinct school include its association with a specific university within North America (Duquesne University in Pittsburgh), which offers a curriculum that includes a phenomenological approach to research methods, clinical practice, and a range of psychological topics (Smith , 1983). The school also publishes its own periodicals, first the _Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry_, and later the _Journal of Phenomenological Psychology_ (hereafter _JPP_), and standard texts such as the _Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology_ series. In addition to the fact that these works are published at Duquesne, a disproportionate number of the contributors and editors of the _JPP_ and the _Duquesne Studies_ are Duquesne faculty, students, or graduates. Duquesne has rightly been called the "capital of phenomenological psychology in the new world" (Misiak and Sexton, 1973, p. 62; Smith, 1981, p. 286).

The phenomenological psychology of the Duquesne School was selected as the branch of phenomenology to be examined here for three reasons. First, the methodolology of the Duquesne School has not yet been put in historical context. Herbert Spiegelberg (1972) has already written a history of phenomenological psychology and psychiatry, but when he wrote the Duquesne department was just beginning to

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flourish, so the Duquesne school received only a brief discussion in that volume. Second, since its founding, there have been new developments in the methodology of CPP which have not yet been documented, such as the wide adoption within CPP of an almost standardized "empirical phenomenological" method, and later the development of an explicitly hermeneutic approach. Third, the Duquesne school is a recent outgrowth of European philosophy, but it has also incorporated methods from outside that tradition. This means that CPP is similar enough to Husserlian phenomenological psychology for a comparison to be meaningful, but different enough from Husserlian psychology to make a critical comparison useful.

Just as phenomenological psychology has many branches, it also has many roots. Prior to Husserl, the philosophical work of Franz Brentano and Wilhelm Dilthey paved the way for Husserlian phenomenology (Husserl, 1977/1962). After Husserl, philosophers including Merleau-Ponty, Heidigger, and Sartre, and scientists such as Aron Gurswitsch and Erwin Strauss developed the discipline before it came into the hands of the present generation of phenomenological psychologists (Spiegelberg, 1972).

Husserl was selected as the philosopher whose prescriptions will be examined here for several reasons. Husserl is generally regarded as the "founding father" of phenomenology. He developed the phenomenological method,

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which was the source of phenomenology as a school of thought, and he offered the most clear and sustained discussions of this method. Even phenomenologists who have disagreed with his theory and practice have built upon his work (Reeder, 1986, p. v). Furthermore, most methodologists of CPP (e.g. Giorgi, 1970; Andrew, 1985, 1986), practicing researchers (e.g. Alapack and Alapack 1976), and historians (e.g. Smith, 1983; Spiegelberg 1972) of phenomenological psychology identify Husserl as one of the founders of their method. Finally, HPP, with its extensive discussion of phenomenological methodology, may help in interpreting and evaluating current research practices in CPP.

There has been little previous research concerned with the relationship between Husserlian and contemporary psychology. Several contemporary phenomenological psychologists have presented historical overviews which have concentrated on contrasting phenomenological psychology with mainstream psychology, but they have offered little analysis of the development of method within CPP (e.g. Giorgi, 1970; Misiak and Sexton, 1973; Keen, 1975; Thines, 1977, Fischer, 1977). Other historical work has presented discussion of prominent philosophers' prescriptions for psychology (e.g. Fluckiger and Sullivan, 1965) but little or no discussion of CPP.

Especially lacking has been any critical comparison of the research methods of CPP and those of Husserlian

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phenomenological psychology. Methodological papers by contemporary phenomenological psychologists offer a detailed discussion of the epistemological issues, but tend to focus on developing a workable psychology on the basis of Husserl's philosophy, stressing similarities between HPP and CPP rather than differences (e.g. Andrew, 1985, 1986). Likewise, historical overviews from within the modern phenomenological method have tended to stress the contributions of HPP to CPP, again stressing similarities between the two phenomenological approaches (e.g. Thinnes, 1977; Giorgi 1970; Misiak and Sexton, 1973). Obvious differences are sometimes discussed, such as the modification or abandonment of the phenomenological reduction. However, the sort of critical historical and methodological discussions Spiegelberg (1972), Kockelemens (1967, 1970) and Strasser (1964, 1975) offered concerning major methodological similarities and differences between Husserlian phenomenology and later existential-phenomenological psychology have not yet appeared for CPP.

The first three chapters of this thesis are descriptive. In the first chapter, Husserl's plan for phenomenological psychology will be outlined. It will be shown that he proposed phenomenological psychology as a basis for empirical psychology and epistemology. The system he outlined was a systematic, universal, and apodictic study of intentional life, using an a priori, intuitive, descriptive method. In the second chapter, the prescriptions of modern

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phenomenological psychological methodology will be discussed. In the third chapter, the practices of CPP will be examined through an analysis of 24 pieces of psychological research published in the JPP.

In the fourth chapter, the prescriptions and practices of CPP will be compared to those of HPP. It will be shown that CPP continues to resemble HPP in its efforts to discover the general structures of experience. However, it has undergone three major shifts in emphasis: whereas HPP was based on the experience of the researcher, was descriptive, and was largely a priori, CPP is based primarily on the experience of participants or subjects other than the researcher, is hermeneutic, and is largely a posteriori.

In the fifth chapter the problems created by the retention of Husserlian essentialism in CPP will be discussed. The problem of essentialism will be seen to be particularly severe when compounded by some apparent laxness in the modern application of the eidetic reduction, and the use of empirical research based on small, non-representative samples. The limits of an essentialistic psychology will be briefly discussed and suggestions will be made for a hermeneutic approach to experiences with culturally constituted structures.

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Chapter One:

Husserl's Project for a Phenomenological Psychology

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline Husserl's methodological prescriptions for phenomenological psychology. The major texts upon which this chapter is based are: Phenomenological Psychology (1977/1962, hereafter referred to as PP); Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, (1982/1913, hereafter, Id I); Cartesian Meditations (1977/1950, hereafter CM), and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Crisis of European Science (1970/1954, hereafter Cr). These texts were selected for their relevance to the topic of method in phenomenological psychology, and for the relatively late dates of their authorship within the life of Husserl, by virtue of which they represent his mature thought. Each was revised by the author after its original preparation: Ideas I was last annotated in 1929, Phenomenological Psychology in 1928; and Cartesian Meditatations in 1933. The unfinished Crisis, which Husserl worked on until the onset of the illness in 1937 which culminated in his death in 1938, represents Husserl's last word on phenomenological psychology.

The present chapter begins with a brief explanation of Husserl's purpose in proposing phenomenological psychology

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as a discipline. Following this, the character of phenomenological psychology as a systematic, universal, apodictic discipline involving an aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, descriptive study of the mental will be described. Then, the method of phenomenological-psychological reduction and free imaginative variation will be outlined. Finally an example of Husserl's use of these techniques in describing an act of perception will be presented.

This chapter will show that Husserl's method was an internally coherent one which was intended to disclose the necessary, universal structures of psychological phenomena, thereby providing both an approach to epistemology and an essential basis for empirical psychology. This discussion will lay the foundation for comparison in later chapters between the methods of Husserlian phenomenological psychology and the methods of contemporary American phenomenological psychology, particularly with respect to the place which apriority, necessity, essence, intuition, and free imaginative variation occupy in the two systems.

The Purpose of Phenomenological Psychology

In Husserl's system of thought phenomenological psychology serves two purposes. The first is epistemological: Phenomenological psychology provides an approach to the grounding of the principles of mathematics and logic by describing the mental acts in which these principles are

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thought. The second is scientific: It provides the set of concepts which form the foundation for empirical psychology, again, by describing these mental acts. While the psychological purpose is ostensibly more relevant than the philosophical one for the present thesis, the philosophical origins and goal of the discipline underscore its distinctive a priori (i.e. non-empirical) approach to psychology, and illuminate why its use was limited primarily to perceptual and cognitive topics, at least in the work of Husserl.

Throughout his intellectual career, Husserl's primary concern was to discover an indubitable grounding for all knowledge. As Hoeller (1982, p. 143) has written, for Husserl the words reason, science, and philosophy were all identical. It was the goal of finding an irrefutable grounding for mathematics and logic which prompted the invention of phenomenological psychology.

Husserl followed Brentano and Dilthey in taking the view that the theory of knowledge must be based on an analysis of knowing (PP, p. 30). The principles of mathematics and logic have their own existence, which is itself "ideal" or "irreal", that is, non-material, non-spatial, and non-temporal. But corresponding to these irreal objects are the particular cognitive acts in which these laws are actually grasped by individuals (p. 17). For example, in counting an individual reproduces the idea of the pure number to which

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the total corresponds (p. 18). Studying the mental acts in which these ideal objects are grasped provides a way of justifying the principles themselves.

However, Husserl wished to avoid the error of psychologism, the claim that epistemology is based on empirical psychology. Against psychologism, he argued that while particular mental acts reproduce numbers, propositions, etcetera, these ideal objects are separate from these acts. The ideal objects contain no "sense" of psychic activities in that they are neither temporal nor restricted to an existence in the actual thoughts of real persons. Instead, they refer to all possible facts (PP, pp. 15-16). Kockelmans has expressed the basic problem of psychologism succinctly: "If we proceed to make logical laws dependent upon the psychological characteristics of various logicians we make the validity of all our principles and laws relative. We make man in all his instability the measure of all things" (Kockelmans, 1967, p. 89).

Husserl's solution to this problem of the contingency of psychological acts was to study mental phenomena with the merely particular elements removed. Husserl proposed basing epistemology on the characteristics of mental acts as they must always ideally be, rather than as they happen to be in particular instances:

> If one goes back from ideal objectivities to the consciousness which forms them subjectively, then

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> one can soon become convinced that the internal passivities and activities in which they are subjectively formed and become evidently given, and which can be intuitively disclosed by methodic reflection and phenomenological analysis, are not empirical contingencies of human act-living, not contingent facticities, which could also be thought differently. Rather, it is evident that whenever something like numbers, mathematical multiplicities, propositions, theories, etc., are to become subjectively given, become objects of consciousness in subjective lived experience, the lived experiences which are needed for that to happen must have their essentially necessary and everywhere identical structure. (PP, p. 27).

However, phenomenological psychology is only the first step toward epistemology. As Husserl pointed out, phenomenological psychology cannot both pose and answer epistemological problems at the same time; its own method needs to be justified (PP, p. 31). The theory of knowledge, transcendental phenomenology, is distinguished from phenomenological psychology because transcendental phenomenology (also called transcendental psychology) is concerned with knowledge, while phenomenological psychology is concerned with knowing. A researcher may move from phenomenological psychology to transcendental phenomenology

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by refraining from positing the existence of the thinking subject, or from transcendental phenomenology to phenomenological psychology by positing knowledge processes as potential acts of knowing in subjects (p. 32).

Phenomenological psychology has another importance in Husserl's system which he only uncovered after recognizing its epistemic importance: It provides a basis for a science of psychology in the form of a set of descriptions of possible mental phenomena (PP, pp. 28- 29). "An a priori science of the psychic, drawing upon purely inner-directed intuition ... could not possibly be without significance for a rigorously scientific empirical psychology" (p. 30). These descriptions are intendeu to be self-evident and universally applicable.

This places phenomenological psychology in the same relation to psychology as a whole which mathematics has to physics. Just as mathematics provides a formal framework for physics, phenomenological psychology provides a formal framework for psychology in general (PP, p. 30). However, there is also an important difference between sciences such as pure mechanics and geometry on one hand, and psychology on the other. Mathematics is a <u>deductive</u> science: It presents a small number of intuitively evident axioms based on ideal concepts and from them it deduces numerous geometrical truths. Phenomenological psychology is a <u>descriptive</u> science: It presents an endless number of

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concepts, each essentially inexact (PP, pp. 36-37; Id I, pp. 166-170).

What is Phenomenological Psychology ?

Fortunately for the present purposes, Husserl wrote more about the method and purpose of phenomenological psychology than he wrote about the contents of its findings. As Scanlon pointed out in his translator's introduction to Phenomenological Psychology, the purpose of much of Husserl's 1925 lecture series was to "discuss throughout the task of a phenomenological clarification of the basic concepts of psychology...<and>...the need for and possibility of a phenomenological approach to the conceptual foundation of psychology" (Scanlon, 1977, p. xi).

Husserl had three criteria which he intended psychology to meet in order to become a successful science. First, it had to provide descriptions which are applicable to all possible cases: "But when one speaks of psychology, one means clearly that it is to be a science of the most universal forms and laws of mental facts in contrast to the sciences of the individual concretions in historical actuality" (PP, p. 39). It was this belief that the task of psychology is to provide universal descriptions rather than interpretations of concrete mental events which primarily distinguished Husserl's project from that of Dilthey (p. 8, 11).

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Secondly, as a science phenomenological psychology had to be indubitable, because the descriptions generated by any science had to be necessary. This necessity manifests itself in an experience of the phenomenon which leaves no doubt for the researcher that it is as it is believed to be. The contrary state of affairs must be unimaginable (CM, pp. 12-16).

Husserl believed that for a discipline to be a science it had to become systematic, as well as universal and indubitable, "one psychology with one necessary method, a necessarily interrelated system of problems to be solved and one necessity of its clearly grasped theme" (PP, p. 66). The universal theme which defines the domain of psychology is intentionality. The problems of phenomenological psychology consist of describing various sorts of intending.

The method for this description was expressed in a series of slogans. The "mottos" of the new psychology were "Apriority, Eidetic, Intuition or Pure Description, Intentionality" (PP, p. 33). The discussion of phenomenological psychology here is organized around these slogans.

By "apriority", Husserl meant that the method of phenomenological psychology is to be one which is non-empirical and non-inductive. Phenomenological descriptions are justified without the need to invoke a collection of past, actual instances to confirm them. This means that

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these descriptions are neither provable nor disprovable by experience. This is not to claim that a phenomenologist may not have had an experience of the type under investigation; in fact it is likely, possibly even necessary, that he or she will have had such an experience.

The meaning of "*a priori*" can be clarified using an example of an analytic judgment. This is a judgment in which the predicate concept is already contained in its subject concept, i.e., a tautology. For example, the proposition "All bachelors are unmarried males" is a priori in that it is known to be true prior to any systematic survey of bachelors, and such a survey could neither prove nor disprove the statement. Other examples of a priori knowledge, less trivial than those presented by tautologies and therefore more like those presented in phenomenological psychology, are the principles of mathematics. For example, our knowledge that the opposite angles formed by two intersecting lines are equal is both a priori and substantive.

The implication of this apriority is that the description which a researcher generates represents not only the features peculiar to the instances of a phenomenon which the researcher has experienced, but also those of any new experiences of the kind in question. A further implication is that a priori descriptions constitute norms against which experiences are checked. For example, if we were to find a

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set of objects for which two plus two appeared to equal five, we would reexamine our counting rather than concluding that this new experience casts doubt on the a priori rules of arithmetic. The technique for disclosing essences a priori will be discussed further when free imaginative variation is considered below.

We have already seen that Husserl demanded that psychology be necessary, or apodictic; apriority and apodicticity are linked together logically. Apodicticity is given in evidence, that is, in a subject's grasping something as it is with a full certainty which excludes doubt. The negation of what is grasped is unimaginable, so that the doubting of it is "empty".

This kind of certainty can be provided only on the basis of a non-empirical method (CM, p. 16; PP, pp. 31, 33, 52). The reason for this equation of apriority with apodicticity is that if a claim is a posteriori, (based on experience, analyzed, for example,through induction), then the claim is based only on a limited set of instances. It is possible that a disconfirming instance could arise to show the claim to be untrue. If a principle can be proven to be necessarilly true, it cannot be disconfirmed in this way. This connection between apriority and apodicticity is such that Husserl linked the two in a definition: "This title apriority means: this psychology aims first of all at those essential universalities without which psychological being

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and living are simply inconceivable" (PP, p. 33). Note that universality is also an implication of apriority (and of apodicticity): That which is necessarily true must also be universally true.

For example, Husserl found a priori that all mental phenomena are intentional. It would simply be meaningless, according to Husserl, to claim that a certain phenomenon is mental if it is not intentional. We would have to regard our belief that such a phenomenon is mental as mistaken (unless there was some mistake in the earlier reflection on the essence of mental phenomena).

The second motto of the method, eidetic, is from eidos, a Greek word meaning "idea". It is drawn with some modifications from the philosophy of Plato (PP, p. 54): "The universal essence is the eidos, the idea in the Platonic sense, but apprehended purely and free from all metaphysical interpretations" (p. 54). Husserl intended phenomenological psychology to be the study of the "ideas" of phenomena, that is, of their essences.

The eidos is the form of the thing; it is what makes a thing what it is. Therefore it is necessary for each object of a given kind to exemplify its eidos to be a thing of that kind. It is the structure of the phenomena (PP, p. 27); that is (in experience) it is the "complex intertwining which belongs to every concrete phase of the streaming psychic life" (p. 6). Every object has an essence (PP, pp.

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69-70). "Object" in this sense includes everything of which a predication can be made, including material things, mental phenomena, and logical and mathematical principles.

The *eidos* then is what phenomena of a certain kind have in common (PP, pp. 54, 62). It is the overlap, that is, what is invariant in the variations among particular things of a certain kind. For the same reason it is also universal to things of a certain kind. These structural universalities apply even beyond the range of our experience (p. 67). This means, for example, that if we know the essence of what it is to be a dog, then we know that whatever dogs we have not yet encountered will also conform to this essence.

The essence is an ideal object. As has already been stated, this means that it exists, but that it is not material. This notion can be clarified by a discussion of the relationship between an essence and the objects which exemplify it. The relationship of real instances of a phenomenon of a certain kind to their *eidos* is that they are "instances" or "moments", of that *eidos*. The *eidos* itself is unconditioned, that is, it is not determined by any particular facts (CM, p. 71). It is not connected to any specific place or time, therefore, it can manifest itself at any and every time (p. 127).

But at the same time the essence is not a metaphysical entity but only an epistemic notion (PP, p. 54). Reeder has

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expressed this by writing that this relationship is like that of a formal cause, but without the "cause" (Reeder, 1986, p. 89). This places the essence and the instance on the same footing; neither one is prior to, nor the cause of, the other. It is in this sense that Husserl differs from Plato: Plato regarded the essence as prior to the instance; Husserl did not.

The third motto of phenomenology is intuition or pure description. The meaning of "intuition" initially appears somewhat ambiguous. As Strasser has pointed out, "When philosophers speak of intuition, the one means that he sees what he sees, and the other that he sees what he does not see" (Strasser, 1963/1974, p. 156). Kant would be an example of the former, and Bergson of the latter. Husserl's use, Strasser noted, is similar to Kant's, but is somewhat broader. For Kant, intuition meant what was immediately directed to an object and unique. Similarly, the simplest sense in which Husserl used "intuition" was to designate sensory intuition of particular objects (Strasser, 1963/1974, p. 156).

The sort of intuition used in phenomenological psychology is the intuition of essences. It is immediately directed toward an object, and unique, but rather than being sensory intuition of material objects, it is non-sensory intuition of ideal objects. Intuition in this sense Husserl also calls "grasping" or "seeing" the essence. This means that

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the model of knowing an essence is not that of inferring, but that of perceiving. The implication is that "seeing" an essence, like seeing a thing, is in a sense a non-intellective, pretheoretical experience; a datum is presented to the observer (Id I, p. 9). Intuition can have varying degrees of clarity (Id I, p. 8). The implication of this characterization of essence, and of intuition, is that there is nothing esoteric or mystical in this intuition of essences. The method for intuiting essences, which will be discussed later in this chapter, is really a refinement of an everyday activity.

By "description", Husserl meant that the task of phenomenological psychology is to elucidate the nature of mental phenomena as they are experienced, rather than for example, to offer explanations concerning the physiological causes of these phenomena, or to analyze our use of mental terms in language.

Husserl's discussion of intuition also further clarifies the meaning of "essence" in his philosophy. The *eidos* itself is not beyond experience; it is immediately perceived. "Just as the data of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the data of eidetic intuition is a pure essence" (Id I, p. 9). In intuition, neither the individual nor the essence is grasped on the basis of grasping the other; both are intuited (Id I, p. 9). The intuition of an object's essence is part of our lived

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experience of an object as a thing of a certain kind (PP, p. 27), that is, it is what we experience something to be when we regard it as an instance of its kind, rather than just as an individual. Pivcevic describes the intuition of an essence as an act in which we direct ourselves upon one constituent part of an experience as a whole, and we perceive the relevant attribute of an object (1970, p. 61). The way in which an essence is intuited is through "ideation", which will be discussed in the next section.

The notion of intuition also clarifies the meaning of "a priori" in phenomenological psychology. "The title of intuition or description designates for us then the source of this a priori" (PP, p. 33). Some philosophers, such as Hume, have found the justification for a priori claims solely in analyticity, while others such as Kant, also found such justification in the necessity of these claims for the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever. However, Husserl found essences to be immediately given.

The fourth motto of phenomenological psychology is intentionality. In reviving the idea of intentionality, Brentano had followed the scholastics, who distinguished the objects of mental acts which have actual objects from those which have objects which are merely "meant within the meaning" (PP, p 23). For example, in the case of someone imagining a unicorn, the unicorn is merely intended. But for Husserl, Brentano's important insight was that

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intentionality is the essance of the psychic: "Consciousness is consciousness of something" (p. 24, 34). This intentionality of all mental events is something which is grasped immediately, prior to all theorizing (p. 22).

The intentional relationship is one which is contained in consciousness itself, therefore it is irrelevant in the description of the act _qua_ intention whether or not the object actually exists. What is intended is simply what is meant, experienced, or judged (PP, pp. 22 -23), or, in short, taken as an object. Consequently, rather than describing the two terms of the intentional relationship as subject and object, they are described as the _ego-pole_ and the _object-pole_ (Reeder, 1986, p. 45).

The object-pole is not the transcendental object, that is, it is not the real object in time and space, but rather it is the object as intended; the immanent object in consciousness. The object-pole is also called the _noematic_ content of the intention, and the mode of intending is called the _noesis_. To elaborate on this distinction, the _noema_ is the multiplicity of data demonstrable in pure intuition or the correlative content of an intention (Id I, pp. 213-217). It is the perceived as it is perceived; the sense of the object. More simply, the _noema_ is the _what_ of an intention. The _noesis_ on the other hand is the _how_ of an intention (PP, p. 158). It is a characteristic of the ego, or "I-pole" (p. 159). The task of the phenomenologist is to

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analyze both the *noesis* and the *noema* of the intentions involved in whatever act is being considered.

While Husserl made this distinction between the mental and the physical in defining the domain of phenomenological psychology, he was not a dualist. He regarded these two realms as different abstractions of a single reality, and as Husserl remarks in *Crisis*, an abstraction is not a substance (p. 229). In other words, the mental and the physical simply represent two aspects of reality which can be identified for study.

To summarize, the relationships among the basic concepts of Husserlian phenomenological psychology are these: Phenomenological psychology is intended to provide a systematic, universal, apodictic set of concepts for empirical psychology. In order to clarify these basic concepts, phenomenological psychology must be descriptive. To make these concepts universal, they must be shown to be necessary. Apriority provides this necessity. A universal, necessary description of a phenomenon represents an essence. The mode of a priori knowledge in phenomenological psychology is the intuition of essences. Intuition is descriptive and includes the perception of necessity. The first conclusion derived from the application of this intuitive method is that all mental phenomena are intentional. Intentionality therefore defines the domain of psychology.

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<u>The Method of Phenomenological Psychology</u>

Husserl identified a number of attitudes toward objects in his writings. Each of these attitudes represents a different stance vis-a-vis the existence of the object of its regard, and each is taken up by the researcher for a specific purpose. A discussion of the attitudes which relate to the practice of phenomenological psychology follows.

The first is the <u>natural attitude</u> characteristic of our everyday consciousness. In it, we accept objects as they present themselves to us, that is, as concretely existing in space and time. Therefore, this attitude includes an ongoing positing of the actuality of the objects of our intentions. This attitude also includes the acceptance of assumptions we derive from our common sense, science, and culture. For this reason, although this attitude is sometimes referred to by Husserl as naive, it is not a pre-theoretical consciousness, but rather one which is unreflective (Id I, p. 56; PP, pp. 34, 41, 146), or as Reeder has termed it, "pre-philosophical" (1986, p. 7).

The second attitude is the <u>phenomenological reduction</u> (PP, p. 143) or <u>epoche</u> (PP, p. 178), a Greek word meaning "abstention". The <u>epoche</u> is the attitude in which the individual abstains from positing the world as existing (Id I, p. 59). This does not mean the denial or doubting of the existence of the world; it only means that the usual

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assumption of the positing of the world is put out of action. For the sake of his inquiry, the researcher does not base any of his claims on the transcendent reality of the type of object which is under consideration.

The effect of this reduction is that experience is reduced to phenomena, so it is treated as purely immanent and subjective (PP, p. 143). In other words, objects are taken only as intended. One implication of this reduced attitude is that statements dependent on the temporal and spatial reality of the world, such as those concerning efficient causation, history, and development, become impossible (Id I, p. 61). Because the natural and social sciences are composed largely of such statements, belief in the principles of these sciences is also suspended.

This suspension of scientific assumptions is like that of the positivists, and natural scientists in general, in that it includes the effort to approach the object of research in an unprejudiced manner. It is also like the phenomenalism of logical positivists in that it takes the subject matter of science to be phenomena, i.e., appearances. However, the phenomenological reduction differs from the reduction of the phenomenalists in that the phenomenologist does not limit the range of phenomena to the sensory, while the phenomenalist does (Id I, p. 62). Consequently, while the phenomenalist would not take the act in which the phenomena is intended as an object for study, the phenomenologist may.

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In fact, Husserl describes the attitude of the physicist as one in which the scientist reflects on immediate experience, but rather than suspending belief in the objective existence of objects, she lays aside the subjective aspects of experience instead (PP, p. 115).

Because the phenomenological reduction retains the _noetic_ aspects of intentional acts intact, while retaining the _noematic_ aspects of intentional acts only in an immanent manner, this attitude directs attention exclusively toward experience and is therefore appropriate for psychological research (PP, p. 144). At the same time, the phenomenological reduction restricts the researcher to the description of experience, since external events which might be candidates for causes of experiences are put out of play.

In _Crisis_, Husserl clarified the attitude appropriate to phenomenological psychology with his discussion of the _phenomenological-psychological reduction_. The purpose of the reduction, as with the phenomenological reduction, is to focus attention on the subject matter of psychology. In it the researcher abstracts from judgements about the reality of the objects of the intentions of the other, and about the reality of the body of the other. This reduction is appropriate because the psychologist's objective is to study the intentions of the other, and the reality of these intentions is not changed when the researcher abstains from any judgements about the real body of the other, which they

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do not concern (Cr, p. 236). Likewise, the reality of the objects of the intentions of the other is not part of the essence of the intentions themselves, so whether or not these intentions are valid is not an issue to the psychologist. In the same way, the psychologist abstains from his own validities of the natural attitude, that is, he does not make any judgements about the reality of objects "out there" himself, except for the reality of his subject's mind (p. 239). As with the phenomenological reduction, the phenomenological-psychological reduction entails the suspension of the researcher's disciplinary beliefs (Fouche, 1984, p. 108).

Husserl justified the view that the phenomenological-psychological reduction gives the psychologist access to the internal world of the subject by arguing that each life reaches intentionally into each other one, and all are woven together into an "association of life" (Cr, p. 240). This is because souls are only external to one another through their embodiment (p. 228). This, in turn, is an implication of Husserl's earlier claim in Phenomenological Psychology that psychological events occur in a single internal causal nexus while physical causation occurs in a determinate number of external causal nexi (e.g. PP, p. 4). The significance of the suspension of belief in the reality of the other's body is that it neutralizes this barrier between persons.

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Phenomenological psychology proceeds through a process of *ideation* or *eidetic reduction*. This is a process in which an object is reduced from an individual instance to a mere example of a thing of its kind, disclosing its essence. (It might equally be said that the instance is "promoted" to an exemplar of things of its kind.) For example, the act of reading this thesis could be reduced to an instance of reading in general. The aspects of the act attaching to this particular piece of reading would be discarded, and only those aspects characteristic of reading in general would be retained. Therefore, phenomenological psychology involves two reductions at once: the phenomenological-psychological reduction, and the eidetic reduction.

The process of eidetic reduction has been split by Reeder (1986) into three stages. Since this division seems to clarify Husserl's discussion, it will be employed here. These three stages are: (a) exemplary intuition, (b) imaginative repetition, and (c) synthesis. These three steps are sometimes collectively called *free imaginative variation*.

Exemplary intuition begins with the researcher intuiting an object which is of the kind whose essence is being sought. The instance may be either real or imaginary (PP, pp. 54, 57; CM, p. 70). It is arbitrarily chosen; which particular instance is picked as a starting point is unimportant provided that it is really an example of the

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type of thing in question. This instance then represents one option among the possibilities for objects of its kind (CM, p. 70).

This instance provides a model for shaping new "images" of the phenomena in fantasy during the second stage of the eidetic reduction, called _imaginative repetition_. These new instances begin as copies of the original. The researcher then varies these copies, freely and arbitrarily, to produce new instances. The way in which the original is varied is unimportant (PP, p. 54). Zaner (1973) has discussed Husserl's view that fiction writing discloses truth by presenting the range of possible, as well as actual, objects and events. The range of variants which are produced is referred to as the _variation_ when taken together; when viewed as a series of individuals it is called the _multiplicity of variation_ (pp. 56-57). This multiplicity of variation is open to infinity, that is, the number of variations on a phenomenon which could be produced is unlimited, but practically the investigation must be terminated at some point. Furthermore, the generation of new variants beyond a certain point will add nothing because the essence will already have been grasped (p. 57).

In the process of free imaginative variation it is important that the variations are kept in the same "direction", that is, as objects of the same kind. It is not acceptable, for example, to include examples of the

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colour green while attempting to discover the essence of the colour red, "therefore, if green appears before me I reject it as not belonging, as clashing with the red which has been seen and continually intended" (PP, p. 61). This injunction to avoid instances which are not compatible with the essence demands that before the researcher commences free imaginative variation prior knowledge is needed of the essence which is being sought. Husserl did not discuss this paradox as a problem. However, this seeming contradiction (that the researcher is expected simultaneously to know and not to know the essence) draws attention to the fact that phenomenological psychology is a means of clarifying lived experience rather than generating entirely new knowledge.

In the third stage, synthesis, the instances which have been brought to mind are integrated. First, they are retained (PP, p. 58). Husserl uses the metaphor of a "mental grip" to indicate that the multiplicity of variation must be kept in mind as a multiplicity; viewing it as a limited plurality, that is, as an unrelated string of objects, is not enough to support the seeing of an essence (p. 58-59). The result of this variation and retention is the intuition of the essence. Husserl describes the essence as "stepping into view", "being grasped", or being "seen". We come to possess it immediately (p. 57).

The essence is the invariant which is the overlapping coincidence of the various instances which are held in mind.

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But this synthesis is not simply this (PP, p. 58). In addition to noticing the overlap among the various instances brought to mind, the researcher must grasp it as necessary and universal (PP, pp. 52, 59, 64). It is not just imagined, but recognized to be necessary to each new instance of objects of this kind which might present itself in the future. It is this grasped necessity, as well as the fictional character of some of the instances, which differentiates essence-seeing from induction. The necessity in this kind of intuition is based on evidence, that is, on the inconceivability that the essence could be other than as the researcher sees it (CM, p. 16).

The eidetic reduction further illuminates the ways in which phenomenological psychology is an a priori discipline. First, unlike a posteriori science it gives weight to possible and future instances as great as the weight it gives to actual and past instances. Second, the closure of the series of variation is the result of the researcher perceiving the necessity of the essence, rather than the result of the exhaustion of actual possibilities, or the use of some systematic sampling procedure. Not only is the seeing of this necessity not itself inductive, but it is temporally prior to the exhaustion of possible variations. Third, the essence which is disclosed in the eidetic reduction is formal; at the time it is intuited it need not have any actual instances which fulfill it, and yet it is expected to apply to, and even define, any future instances

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which might present themselves.

The differences between instances which are discerned in the process of uncovering the essence each point to another essence. For example, if the essence being sought is that of the colour red, then one thing which differentiates red things generated in fantasy from one another is shape. The essence of this difference among red objects (i.e., shape) can itself be sought in a later exercise in free imaginative variation (PP, p. 60).

Essences themselves can be placed into hierarchies of species and genus. Variations in different series can be connected into more comprehensive multiplicities of variation. For example, if one series of variations yields the essence green while another yields the essence red, these two essences can both be subsumed under the more general essence colour (PP, p. 61). Husserl explained that we form ideas of collections, relations, etc., by generating ideas out of ideas, that is, by taking essences themselves as the instances for the procedure of free imaginative variation (p. 62).

It is also possible for higher order essences to be generated by accident. If a researcher sets out to discover one essence, but "loses his grip" on the direction of variation by introducing instances which do not conform to the essence being sought, then he may discover a higher-order essence. For example, if a green object is introduced

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as an instance of the essence "red", then the essence "colour" will emerge (PP, p. 61).

Husserl used the example of seeing the essence of the colour red to illustrate free imaginative variation (PP, pp. 59-60); his example will be elaborated somewhat here. If someone wished to grasp the essence of the colour red, he or she would begin with an example of a red thing, such as an apple. This red thing is seen to be extended, to occupy space, and to be roughly spherical. It is white inside, edible, sweet, and crispy. It has a distinctive odour, and so on. Keeping the image of the apple in mind the researcher would then imagine some variation on it. Which of these qualities can be varied without changing the colour? What about the flavour? Yes, a tomato has a colour similar to the apple, but a different flavour, so flavour is not part of redness. What about shape? Yes, something cylindrical or pyramidal and still red is possible. What about the brightness? A thing can be tinted to a certain degree and still be red, but if it is lightened too much it fades through pink to white. The same with shade: If the colour is darkened too much it becomes black. Therefore a colour must be within a certain range of brightness to be red.

Eventually the researcher "sees" the redness which is the essence all of these red things exemplify. Moreover, this essence is seen to be necessary to these red things: She or

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he cannot imagine how they might be red without it. At the same time, the researcher sees that all red things which exist, and any new examples of red things will also possess this essence.

An Example of Phenomenological Psychology

The example just presented might strike the reader as somewhat trivial, the insight it offers being so minimal as to present nothing more than a tautology: that red things must look a certain way. But there are many examples of more insightful research in the work of both Husserl and his successors. Husserl's claim that all psychic events are intentional has already been mentioned. Another is Sartre's discovery, affirmed by Merleau-Ponty, that the essence of imagination is an absent object's giving itself to the subject as present, with the incorporation of the absent object carried out with perceptual elements as an analogue of that object (Merleau-Ponty, 1961, pp. 59-60).

In *Phenomenological Psychology*, Husserl discussed the perception of a real object at length as part of the process of defining the tasks of the various sciences. While he did not describe all of the details of his inquiry, (he generally omitted most of the instances generated in free imaginative variation), his discussion clarifies the way in which the phenomenological reduction, the eidetic reduction, and the analysis of intentional acts in terms of *noesis* and *noema* are used in Husserlian phenomenological psychology.

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He describes how initially, the researche' in the natural attitude and simply experiences the object, for example, a cube, in a straightforward way. This perceptual experience is not the object of any reflection, and the object is taken as it presents itself, that is, as a single, really existing thing (PP, p. 115).

Then, as the researcher takes up the phenomenological attitude and reflects on this act of perceiving, he realizes that he is actually noticing the object through several kinds of intentions which are continuous with one another. These modes may include grasping the object, looking at each of its sides, opening it, and so on. Each of these different intentions is a different "how" in the way in which the object is subjectively given, that is, each is noetically different. However, although these acts constitute a multiplici./, the researcher continues to notice a unity, i.e., one and the same object. It is significant to note that the unity of the object "permeates" these various acts, so that their diversity only becomes apparent through reflection. In the natural attitude this diversity went unnoticed; even though this diversity was part of the lived experience of the object, it was unconscious (PP, p. 116).

But since the object as a whole never appears in any one of these modes, the question then arises concerning how the object is perceived as unified. How can the unity of the

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object be maintained throughout its changing orientations relative to the observer, the observer's varying perspective, the observer's impressions through different senses, and so on? First, Husserl notices that this unity of the object is not something separate and alongside these modes of giveness, but amid them. Each mode is directed toward the object, which functions as the noematic pole of these intentions. Metaphorically, the object is the intersection of the directions of these intentions. In fact it was the object-pole which fully occupied the researcher's attention in the natural attitude (PP, p. 117). Therefore, commonness in direction is one factor unifying these various intentions in experience.

Further reflection reveals that the particular appearence associated with each act has its own specific place in making up the perceived object. "The appearences must fit together as such; one can not arbitrarily feel them together or even arbitrarily bring appearences snatched out of the perceptual series of different objects, together in one perceptual series" (p. 118). This position in the series is "in" each of these appearences. If, for axample, we see the front of a piece of paper, we expect that if we turn it over we will see the back.

The appearences of the object form a unity for the senses of sight concerning the number, shape, and location of the object, and for the sense of touch. Also, these two senses

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agree with one another. "If the spatial-temporal something into which I can grope as well as look, is something identically in common, then everything grasped by the one sense (for instance, exhibiting itself visually) <u>must</u> belong also in the realm of the others, i.e., of that which is to be objectively laid hold of by them" (PP, pp. 118-119).

Continuing with his description, Husserl noted that every object appears in some orientation. Experientially, this orientation is defined relative to the body of the perceiver. The appearence of the object varies according to its orientation relative to the observer, whether this changing orientation is the result of the movement of the observer or the movement of the object. For example, for an observer standing in front of and above a cube, the angle between the front and the sides appears to be acute, while the angle between the back and the sides appears to be obtuse. If the cube is rotated 180 degrees, the same holds true, but now the observer is looking at the opposite side. Each position of the cube is accompanied by a certain apparent shape, which includes certain distortions. However, we are able to perceive the cube as it objectively is, composed of square sides and right angles, by synthesizing these various appearences in relation to our perspective. A position directly opposite a face of the cube is a privileged perspective because the square appearence of one face of the cube from that position agrees with its objective shape; this is the "limit case" (PP, pp.

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121-123).

To summarize, an object comes to appear unified throughout the various acts in which it is perceived due to: the agreement in the direction of the _noesis_; the agreement and mutually supplementary content of the _noema_; the agreement among the various senses concerning location, number and direction; and the correlation between changes in perspective and changes in appearence. (Each of these four bases of the synthesis overlap.) This example is only a portion of Husserl's analysis of the act of perception.

Summary

Husserl proposed phenomenological psychology as a step toward an epistemological basis for mathematics and logic, and later as the basis for the science of psychology. Husserl hoped to make psychology a universal, systematic, apodictic discipline. Consequently he argued that it ought to be an aprioric, intuitive study of the essences of intentional acts. The method of this discipline was to consist primarily of the application of the phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction, focussing on _noetic-noematic_ relationships. A typical example of the employment of these methods was Husserl's analysis of an act of perception.

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Chapter Two: Methodological Prescriptions in Contemporary Phenomenological Psychology

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methodology of contemporary phenomenological psychology (CPP) as it appears in methodological papers written by authors within this movement. The task of the present chapter is not to account for the origins of these methods, nor to evaluate them, but simply to represent them clearly and succinctly in preparation for a comparison of the research prescriptions and practices of CPP with those of Husserlian phenomenological psychology (HPP).

In order to identify a body of literature representative of the methodological prescriptions of CPP the following procedure was adopted. In the first step, methodological papers and texts referred to in the 24 papers selected for review in Chapter Three (see Appendix B) were collected. In the second step, all remaining methodological papers from the *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* (*JPP*) were collected. The *JPP* was selected because it is the only North American journal explicitly concerned with the publication of phenomenological research, and it is in fact the major locus of such publications. This resulted in the examination of 29 papers and texts (see Appendix C).

Upon inspection of these publications it became apparent that there is a high degree of consistency, and frequent

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historical connections manifested by mutual citations, among the methodological prescriptions of CPP. Also, CPP research practices can be traced to a core of methodological sources. For example, of the 24 studies selected for review in the third chapter of this thesis, nine cited work by Giorgi (1970, 1975, etc.) while two more cited work by Collaizi (1978) as the source of their method. In turn, the methods which Giorgi and van Kaam discussed are developments of that of van Kaam. Subsequent discussions on methodology have been elaborations of issues which van Kaam intially introduced or which Husserl and other phenomenological philosophers introduced. This chain of influence has also been identified by von Eckartsberg (1986) in a discussion of method, and Smith (1981) in a history of the graduate department at Duquesne.

CPP methodology, then, can be viewed as an accretion of more refined prescriptions around the method initially practiced by van Kaam. (It is notable that the premier sources of phenomenological method were not primarily methodological papers, but were actual examples of research.) Therefore, CPP prescriptions are treated here as a largely consistent set of statements, in which later articles augment earlier ones. The discussion in this chapter of this evolving method will initially follow a chronological order, beginning with van Kaam's (1958) paradigmatic research on the experience of feeling really understood by another person, followed by Giorgi's (1975)

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widely-cited example of phenomenological research, and a variation by Collaizi (1978). Following that, prescriptions by these and later authors will be discussed theme by theme. As each aspect of method is presented, any variations on it will also be noted.

Adrian van Kaam's Phenomenal Analysis

Adrian van Kaam received his initial education in existential and phenomenological psychology at the University of Nijmegen in The Netherlands. He was trained in psychotherapy at the University of Chicago under Carl Rogers, and at the Alfred Adler Institute under Randolph Dreikurs. In 1957, Van Kaam studied advanced personality theory under Abraham Maslow, Kurt Goldstein, and Andreas Angyall at Brandeis University. For his 1958 doctoral dissertation "The Experience of Really Feeling Understood by a Person: A Phenomenological Study of the Necessary and Sufficient Constituents of this Subjective Experience as Described by 365 Subjects" he developed the method which has been so influential in CPP (Smith, 1981).

Van Kaam subsequently discussed his dissertation research in an article in the Journal of Individual Psychology (1959) and in his book, Existential Foundations of Psychology (1966). Because this piece of research has become paradigmatic for CPP, it is in effect a set of prescriptions for future research as well as a description of a single

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inquiry. This is to be kept in mind while reading the following description of his research.

As a psychologist approaches a phenomenon van Kaam urged that:

> The question he will ask himself is, what is this phenomenon? What exactly is this feeling and what distinguishes it from every other subjective experience? Or to formulate it more exactly: WHAT ARE THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONSTITUENTS OF THIS FEELING? <emphasis in the original text>, (van Kaam, 1958, p. 7).

This question was to be solved without going beyond the limits of observation (1966, p. 302). The focus of the study was "inner experience", as expressed in the statements of research subjects. The function of the research was to render explicit what was already implicit in the awareness of these subjects (p. 305-307). The method of doing the research was to elicit reports of the experiences from many subjects, then to detect the invariant aspects of their accounts; this represented the necessary and sufficient constituents of the experience (p. 310).

In selecting his sample, van Kaam sought subjects who were not specialists in psychology, who could express themselves with ease in English, who had participated in the experience, who could sense and express their inner feelings, and who had an interest in the experience (1958,

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p. 34; 1966, p. 317). He selected 150 female high school seniors, 95 male high school seniors, 60 female college students, and 60 male college students in order to fulfill these criteria.

The subjects received written instructions to provide some general personal information (e.g., age and gender). They were then asked to:

> Describe how you feel when you feel that you were being understood by somebody.
>
> (a) Recall some situation or situations where you felt you were being understood by somebody; for instance by mother, father, clergyman, wife, husband, girlfriend, boyfriend, teacher, etc.
>
> (b) Try to describe how you felt in that situation (not the situation itself).
>
> (c) Try to describe your feelings just as they were.
>
> (d) Please do not stop until you feel that you have described your feelings as completely as possible (1958, p. 34).

Van Kaam then carried out a six stage explication of the resulting protocols. These stages were not entirely discrete and sequential; they overlapped.

In the first stage the researchers selected 20% of the protocols and the discrete constituent statements were listed and tentatively grouped. This listing and grouping

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of expressions was performed by two researchers in addition to the author, and intersubjective concurrence was sought. The initial list was then augmented by these other researchers so that it included every basically different type of statement made by the subjects. In the case of a disagreement, the element in question was included in the list rather than omitted. The listing indicated the frequency of each expression (i.e., the percentage of the sample who had included that moment of the experience) (1966, p. 315). This led to a list of 157 descriptive statements. In a further listing these 157 expressions were grouped under 16 headings.

The second phase was the reduction of these expressions to precise descriptive terms. The purpose of this reduction was to give these expressions clarity and organization. It too required the agreement of two judges (1959, p. 58).

The third and fourth phases of the explication were the elimination of elements which were not inherent in the experience of feeling really understood by another person, and which were only specific to the situation of the subject or the phenomenon which accompanied it. The irrelevance of a statement to the research question or the presence of a statement in the protocol of only one or a few participants constituted grounds for omission from subsequent stages of the analysis (1966, p. 315).

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The fifth phase of the explication was the hypothetical identification and description of the phenomenon in question. A tentative statement was made concerning the necessary and sufficient constituents of the phenomenon of really feeling understood by a person. A comparison of these various accounts led to the listing of nine moments or constituents of the experience in question.

Lastly, in the sixth phase of the explication, the researchers attempted to validate the description obtained in the fourth phase. They randomly selected cases from the 80% of the original sample which was not used in the first five stages of the analysis. They compared the general description to these cases and revised it by elimination: those elements which were shown to be unnecessary by their absence in newly selected studies were dropped.

Soon, van Kaam introduced the methodology of his research to the students and faculty of Duquesne University. Van Kaam joined the Psychology programme at Duquesne in 1954, although it was not officially founded until 1959. In the 1959-1960 academic year, van Kaam directed a research seminar for students doing theses under his direction. At that time, Smith (1981) records, European phenomenological writings were not yet available in English, so van Kaam "acquainted" the Duquesne psychological community with these writings through discussion and lectures. In the 1962-63 academic year and following, van Kaam taught a course in

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"empirical phenomenological" research which used the method that he had developed for his dissertation. The courses which van Kaam taught were the basis of his 1966 text, Existential Foundations of Psychology.

Amadeo Giorgi's Phenomenological Method

One of van Kaam's students, and later one of his colleagues, was Amadeo Giorgi. Giorgi was associated with the Duquesne psychology department from 1962 to 1986. He was also a frequent contributor to the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry (e.g., Giorgi, 1966, 1967, 1968), English Language Editor of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology from 1970 to 1986, and an editor of that journal to the time of writing (1989). He has published numerous frequently cited articles on phenomenological psychological methodology (e.g., 1966, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1975 etc.) Smith, in his brief history of the graduate department of psychology at Duquene, wrote:

> Giorgi has worked with other scholars at Duquesne to develop qualitative and descriptive methodologies for the study of human phenomena. He pioneered the development of the first strictly empirical-phenomenological methodology for human scientific research in the late sixties and has initiated a number of projects to disseminate this psychology (Smith, 1983, p. 305).

Giorgi's influence is illustrated by the fact that of the 24 pieces of research reviewed for Chapter Three, 11 cited his

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1975 paper titled, "An Application of the Phenomenological Method in Psychology" as the source of their method.

Giorgi based the method of this influential paper on that of van Kaam's research. Giorgi's paper, like van Kaam's, combined general methodological prescriptions with an actual account of their application. This example was not intended to be paradigmatic, but it has been. Both Giorgi and van Kaam aimed for a description of an experience based on accounts solicited from volunteer subjects. Both also used an analysis made up of several stages, which resulted in a summary of the general features of this experience.

But there were significant differences between the methods of the two researchers. Giorgi based his article on an open-ended interview rather than on a written account. And while van Kaam collected 365 accounts of the experience he investigated, Giorgi collected only one.

The topic of Giorgi's research was the experience of learning. The participant he interviewed related an experience in which she learned about the strategic use of lines in interior decorating. First, Giorgi transcribed the interview and read over the protocol to get its "sense", trying to read the description without prejudice. He extracted the "natural meaning units" from the original protocol, as van Kaam had extracted the "constituent statements". He then identified the theme for each of these meaning units.

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The next stage was to interrogate each of these themes in terms of the specific purpose of the study. The principle question used to interrogate the data in this study was, "What does this statement tell me about learning?" (Giorgi, 1975, p. 89).

Then, Giorgi drew the themes together into a descriptive statement. This description took place on two levels: The first was the situated level of description which included the concreteness and the specifics of the actual research situation. The second was the general level, which left out the particulars of the research situation and centered on the trans-situational aspects of the experience (1975, p. 88). This represented a notable difference from the method of van Kaam (1958). Van Kaam's identification of the general features of an experience was based on the inductive analysis of a large number of accounts. However, Giorgi based his generalizations on only one account, suggesting an implicit dependence on some kind of _a priori_ method.

At both the situational and the general level, the description included both structural and stylistic features. Structural themes answered the question, "What is learning?", while stylistic themes answered the question, "How did learning take place?" (Giorgi, 1975, p. 88). In thematizing the protocol, Giorgi tried to take the viewpoint of the interviewee (p. 95).

Collaizi's Existential-Phenomenological Method

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A third methodologist whose work was less cited than that of Giorgi but who described a similar method and one also derived from van Kaam's approach was Paul F. Collaizi (1978). Two researchers whose papers were selected for review in Chapter Three indicated that they based their research method on unpublished material by Collaizi. He described a procedure in which he interviewed each participant concerning an experience of reading which was profoundly significant for her in order to construct a general description of the experience.

This analysis included seven stages:

1. The researcher reads the protocols.
2. The researcher extracts significant statements and eliminates redundancies.
3. The researcher formulates the meanings in the protocol including those which were initially hidden.
4. The researcher organizes the aggregate of formulated meanings into clusters of themes common to the protocols.
5. The researcher writes an exhaustive description of the experience.
6. The exhaustive description is formulated as an unequivocal description of the fundamental structure of the experience.
7. The participants review this exhaustive description to validate it (Collaizi, 1978, p. 61).

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He found that the experience of reading a significant book included the "discovery of new ways of living in the world" and that it "unifies interests, attitudes, and efforts,...illuminates the reader and challenges (him) to embark upon the existential project which the book announces" (p. 65).

Methodological Prescriptions

While the above discussion of van Kaam (1958), Giorgi (1975), and Collaizi (1978) provides some idea of how research in phenomenological psychology can proceed through the qualitative analysis of an interview or a written description of an experience, the authors of these papers offered them only as examples. They were not intended to be general theoretical discussions of methodology. They also did not elaborate on the details of their research practice (e.g., interviews, content analysis, etc.). In the remainder of this chapter, these other prescriptions for research will be discussed.

The goal of phenomenological psychology is the study of experience or consciousness (e.g., Giorgi, 1967, p. 173). More specifically, it is "the study of the structure, and the variations of structure, of the consciousness to which any thing, event, or person appears" (Giorgi, 1975, p. 83). The various prescriptions of phenomenological psychology are all aimed at implementing this study of consciousness.

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"Experience" is not understood by phenomenological psychologists as something wholly subjective or private. Because CPP theorists have adopted the notion of intentionality, they have rejected the subject-object dichotomy. Therefore, they have also rejected the dichotomous view of experience as subjective and behaviour as objective (Collaizi, 1978, p. 52). Instead, the two are seen as forming a structure with two aspects, the experiential and the behavioural, unified by the intention of the agent (Giorgi, 1983, p. 137). The subject has a privileged but not exclusive perspective on experience, while the observer has a privileged but not exclusive perspective on action. To capture these two aspects, the relatively private and the relatively public, the subject matter of CPP has sometimes been termed "experiaction" (von Eckartsberg, 1971, p. 166) or "experience-behaviour dialectics" (Giorgi, 1967, p. 113).

This theme of the primacy of experience is a correlate of one of the central claims of phenomenology: that knowledge is in the appearence of things, not behind them. It is a repudiation of the tendency of post-Galilean science to regard theoretical entities as more real than experiences (van den Berg, 1961). The metaphysical and ontological correlate of the epistemological primacy of experience is the primacy of the life-world, that is, the world as it exists for the subject. This life world is the ground of science, that is, it is prior to the abstractions of

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science. Closely related to this is the slogan "Back to the things themselves", a Husserlian call to direct philosophizing at the phenomenon of experience rather than at abstractions (Giorgi, 1975, p. 99).

The implication of this view for research is that experience is to be treated as primary, while whatever theoretical entities and processes are used to explain experience are secondary to it. Consequently phenomenological psychology "respects" and does not try to "explain away" the experiences of the subject using theoretical entities or processes (Giorgi, 1967, p. 10). Another implication of this priority is that psychological description is better than abstraction for dealing with concrete human cases (Giorgi, 1970, p. 172; 1975, p. 99). This description ought to precede experimentation (van Kaam, 1966, p. 254-257) as well as theorizing (p. 271). At this point in the history of the discipline it is unclear whether or not psychology is the possible subject of a formalized science, since mental phenomena may not form a definite manifold (that is, a set of phenomena connected by clear and necessary relations). Therefore, psychology initially ought to proceed descriptively (Giorgi, 1986).

In addition to being referred to as experience, the subject matter of CPP is sometimes identified as "meaning". Meaning is what the subject experiences as happening to her (Giorgi, 1983, p. 161). Meaning includes the functional

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significance of the experience under consideration, and the situation in which it takes place and toward which it is directed (Giorgi, 1967, p. 72; 1983, p. 137). Thus, meaning is linked conceptually with intentionality as both are based on directedness, toward an object.

It is significant to note that phenomenologists of the Duquesne school do not take the same reductionistic view of experience which Titchnerian structural introspectionists, Rogerians, and other empiricists take. Rogerians for example claim that experience is intially "organismic", sensory, spatially and temporally bound, and only later rendered conceptual in a secondary, (generally unfortunate) "intensional", process (Meador & Rogers, 1984). The CPP conception of experience as including "meaning" implies that while there may be experience which has been lived but not yet reflected upon, it is always initially intentional, and there is no pre-conceptual experience (Giorgi, 1983, pp. 131, 137).

Earlier, the statement was made that the primacy of experience is the fundamental principle of phenomenological psychology. In the course of a piece of research, this primacy of experience appears first in the form of the research participants' contribution to the definition of the phenomenon under investigation. Rather than defining the phenomenon in advance, the researcher defines it on the basis of the subjects' experience and the researcher's

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phenomenological analysis, which is in turn based on the researcher's experience (Giorgi, 1983, pp. 157-159). In fact, because phenomenological psychology is largely the effort to identify the essential (necessary and sufficient) features of a phenomenon, this process of definition is often the real task of a piece of phenomenological research; van Kaam's (1958, 1966) seminal piece of research was, in effect, an extended effort to define that experience.

CPP methodologists recommend a deliberately naive approach to the topic of research. For example, Aanstoos (1983, p. 253) favours "bracketing", that is, abstaining from presupposing the real existence of the objects of the intentions under investigation. He also recommends suspending any theoretical beliefs pertaining to the topic (an aspect of bracketing) as a way to achieve direct contact with the world and to become more interested in the phenomenon under consideration.

CPP methodologists widely comment that the aim of presuppositionlessness is impossible to attain in practice (e.g., Keen, 1975, p. 148; Kvale, 1983, p. 184). Instead, they suggest that researchers should attempt to recognize and articulate their presuppositions (Giorgi, 1975, p. 101). Another possibility is for researchers to articulate their presuppositions, then to transform these assumptions into questions and present them to participants in order to examine their validity (Collaizi, 1978, p. 58). In the case

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of an interview, the researcher attempts to include a critical consciousness of his or her presuppositions in questioning the participant (Kvale, 1983).

Reacting in a different way to the phenomenological reduction, Fidela Fouche (1984) has challenged the value rather than the possibility of presuppositionlessness (in the form of the phenomenological reduction.) As was indicated in Chapter One, Husserl urged the psychologist to refrain from making judgments about the reality of the objects of the other's experience. Fouche argues that this serves no purpose, and in fact removes the criteria for useful distinctions, such as the difference between persecution and paranoia, or between perception and hallucination.

The methodological discussions of modern phenomenological psychologists are typically aimed at the researcher studying the experience of other individuals. This practice, as opposed to the practice of the researcher examining personal or fictional experience, is actually assumed rather than advocated by most methodologists (e.g., Kvale, 1983). However, vam Kaam (1958) offered some justification for it: It is important that the researcher collect many accounts of an experience to ensure that his conclusions are generalizable.

The quality of the interpersonal relationship between researcher and participant during the interview is a

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consideration in CPP. The relationship advocated is one of mutual respect and cooperation, rather than manipulation (Kvale, 1983, pp. 178-181). The same attitude is manifest in the writings of researchers who refer to those who provide descriptions for their studies as "co-investigators" or "respondents" rather than "subjects", suggesting that the status of the two participants is equal and that the relationship of researcher to respondent ought to be "I-thou" (subject-to-subject) rather than "I-it" (subject-to-object). Kvale also urged the researcher to leave the interviewee with a positive feeling by encouraging the respondent to approach the research with an attitude of curiosity and engagement. He anticipated that a research experience would provide the subject with insights into his own experience and with a view to action on this insight (1983, p. 181).

At some point in a van Kaam-style phenomenological research project, the researcher must somehow prompt the participant to bring an experience into awareness in order to describe it. This happens through an interview or a printed question. Participants are asked to think of a specific experience rather than to offer generalizations about experiences of the kind under investigation . Barrell and Barrell (1983) have discussed both the possibility of describing a present experience, and of reliving a past one. In either case, participation in the experience, either through present experience or recollection, alternates with

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description of that experience. These two authors urged the subject to present a first-person, present-tense account of an experience

The researcher may actually create the situation in which the participant describes an experience. In one version of this approach, a conventional psychological experiment is combined with phenomenological description (e.g., Giorgi: A Phenomenological Approach to the Problem of Meaning and Serial Learning). Aanstoos (1983) urges the use of the think-aloud method, particularly in cognitive psychology, in which a subject comments verbally on thoughts associated with an episode of problem-solving. The author argues for the superiority of thinking aloud over retrospection, citing evidence for the inaccuracy of retrospective accounts and arguing that the think-aloud research participant is directed toward the task rather than toward a past experience.

Phenomenological psychologists typically do not consider this process of reflecting upon experience to be introspection (e.g., Giorgi, 1983, p. 130). This is consistent with their rejections of the notion that experience is internal and their rejection of the metaphor of introspection as an inward-directed sense. Rather phenomenological psychologists regard reflection as a bending back of attention on one's already lived experience. This bending back discloses what is already present but not

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yet attended to and articulated.

Methodologists have suggested several ways in which subjects may be prompted to recount their experience as they reflect upon it or relive it. One issue on which they have focussed attention is how to evoke description undistorted by prompting from the researcher or by the participant's response to the interview situation itself. Van Kaam (1966) indicated that the "phenomenal analyst" should use only one question in order to obtain a spontaneous description of the experience from the subject and in order to avoid biasing the report. Collaizi (1978), on the other hand, prepared several questions. A number of methodologists recommended open-ended interviews (Giorgi, 1975; Kvale, 1983; Sardello 1971), arguing for the advantage of conversation over writing in obtaining a more accurate description of experience. Sardello (1971) argued against the use of the written protocol on the grounds that writing results in "sedimentation" of the experience, while responding in an interview reflects the historicity of the researcher, the phenomenon, and its explication.

Phenomenologists do not ask participants to describe their experience in terms of the interaction of a number of discrete sensory, affective, or volitional elements separable through introspection. Instead, a phenomenologist asks the subject to describe an experience in the terms of natural language, or asks the subject to relate this

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experience to other aspects of experience, such as experience of time, situation in life project, and so on. This search for meaning (already mentioned above) differentiates phenomenological psychology from structuralist introspectionism (Giorgi, 1983, p. 131).

Another issue related to the research interview or written protocol is the sensitivity and reliability of language per se as a means of conveying the sense of experience. Van Kaam (1958) noted that since much of our vocabulary was developed to deal with the physical world, it is difficult to use it to describe inner experience, but that at the same time, the researcher can depend on his commonality of experience with the subject to overcome this barrier. Generally however, this question of the reliability of language, and with it the "problem of other minds" has received little attention. Methodologists consistently assume that experiences, while historically and biographically constituted, are essentially similar from person to person, and are univocally related to mental terms in such a way as to make them mutually intelligible. For example, Giorgi (1975, p. 100) emphasizes the power of language as a tool for communicating experience.

Cognizant of the research of Orne (1962) concerning the social psychology of the psychology experiment, CPP researchers have stated the importance of determining the meaning of the research situation itself for the subject

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(Giorgi, 1967, p. 175; Sardello, 1971, p. 63; von Eckartsberg, 1971, p. 70). Von Eckartsberg (1971, p. 74) has suggested that both the researcher and the participant give a report about their experience, record this, and make it the focus of an inquiry by an outside investigator. Also, the scientist must take into account the influence of his or her own presence and assumptions on the outcome of the research. Since it may not be possible to discard these assumptions, they must at least be articulated (Collaizi, 1978, pp. 53-55; Giorgi, 1970, pp. 162, 189).

The purpose of phenomenological research is the explication or detailed description of an experience (e.g., Giorgi, 1975, p. 101). In stating the goal of phenomenological psychology Collaizi (1978, p. 52) quoted Heidegger (1968): "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." This implies a description of as many aspects as possible of the phenomenon under investigation. Consequently, research participants are asked to tell as much as they can about their experience (e.g., vam Kaam, 1958).

Consistent with this, the attitude which CPP methodologists prescribe for the researcher is one of maximal "openness" and alertness to the phenomena. Anything which the subject wishes to mention is incorporated, including the context as well as the specific expressions of

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an experience (Giorgi, 1975, pp. 99-100). Kvale (1983) stressed the importance of the sensitivity of the researcher and the direction of his or her attention to the experience under consideration. The attitude of openess has been described as a reflective attitude, with "openess and listening to being in all its manifestations" (von Eckartsberg, 1986, p. 19). Consequently, the researcher edits out nothing related to the experience. Sardello (1971) followed van Kaam (1959) and Giorgi (1967) by suggesting that in reading the protocol the researcher attempt to relive the experience of the participant.

Typically, CPP researchers offer the participant some opportunity to interpret the description of their own experience. Recall that van Kaam validated the results of his research by presenting the extended description of the experience of feeling really understood by someone to the participants for affirmation. Other researchers advocate the subjects reviewing the explication to confirm that they can "see" it (Sardello, 1971, p. 63). In 1975, Giorgi (p. 100) stated that the subject's viewpoint is part of phenomenological psychology. Earlier (1967, p. 171), he linked the importance of the subject's viewpoint to the importance of experience in phenomenological psychology.

But the subject does not have exclusive responsibility for interpreting an experience, and various methodologists differ in the extent to which they permit the subject to

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express an opinion concerning its meaning. Adopting Merleau-Ponty's point of view on the relationship of behaviour and experience, Giorgi argued for an integration of the understanding of the researcher and the experience of the participant as internal and external perspectives which actually overlap; the external observer has the privileged viewpoint with respect to behaviour, and the subject has the privilaged viewpoint with respect to experience (pp. 181-183, 194-198; cf. Collaizi, 1978, p. 54). Consonant with tnis view, Giorgi commented that the subject communicates more than he is aware, and the researcher can discern more meanings in the communication than the subject (Giorgi, 1983, p. 162).

Kvale (1983) allows the researcher some primacy over the subject in that the analysis of the interview includes not only the level of self-understanding, but also a second level, common sense, and a third level, theory. The researcher may present critical examination at the second level; for example a researcher might believe that "The lady doth protest too much, methinks" if a subject puts too much stress on some state of affairs as not being the case. However, Kvale adds that the subject is allowed to comment on the researcher's results in a second interview and correct or elaborate his or her account. While the purpose of a qualitative research interview is to clarify the account of an experience as much as possible, some ambiguity may remain (Kvale, 1983, p. 177).

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Aanstoos (1983, p. 256) has similarly stated that the structure of an experience may not be known by the organism, but may be known by another who grasps it as a structure. Other methodologists also recommend the subject collaborating in the interpretation (e.g., Sardello, 1971, p. 64).

Recently, Giorgi (1989) has commented that because the researcher is a psychologist with access to more accounts of an experience than the subject has, and has reflected on these experiences, and because experience is partially unconsciously influenced, the researcher has priority in interpreting the experience of the subject. This is the strongest statement of the priority of the researcher in interpreting the experience of the participant found in the literature reviewed here.

Typically, methodologists in CPP suggest that the researcher's description of an experience take the form of a description of the structure of that experience. This structure represents the essence of the phenomenon; it includes the necessary and sufficient features which define it. This structure is constituted by the meanings attributed by the subject and the researcher to the experience. The structure is made up of both the temporal and lateral relationships which make up an experience, so that each of the constituents of the structure is considered in its total context (Barrell and Barrell, 1983, p. 69;

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Giorgi, 1975, p. 100). The temporal relationships are the relationships among the constituents of an experience as it develops through time. The lateral elements consist of the relationships among the aspects of the experience, as well as the relationships between the acts which constitute the experience and the intentional objects to which they refer, that is, to its noetic-noematic relations. Giorgi (1975) has used the term "style" specifically to refer to the "how" of an experience, i.e. to its noetic features. The structure is intended to be general, that is, it should be descriptive not simply of a single experience or the experiences the researcher studied, but of other experiences of the kind under investigation (Aanstoos, 1983, p. 257; Giorgi, 1983, p. 138; Kvale, 1983, p. 184).

In interpreting descriptions of experiences, key methodologists endorse free imaginative variation (see Chapter One for an explanation of this Husserlian term), (Aanstoos, 1983, pp. 256, 258; Kvale, 1983, p. 184; Wertz, 1986, p. 209). Other researchers do not refer specifically to free imaginative variation, but indicate similar procedures, such as "facticity-possibility dialectics" (Barrell & Barrell, 1983, p. 69). When these techniques are used, the experience of each subject acts as a variant in the eidetic reduction.

One variation on this practice is that of attempting to discover "empirical essences". W. K. Andrew (1985, 1986)

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has provided an extended discussion of this "empirical phenomenology" based on the work of Husserl. It proceeds in much the same way as free imaginative variation, but without the use of imaginary instances. Instead, only real cases are employed as variants. This makes the practice of eiditic reduction identical to the practice of induction. However, the results are limited to the actual situation from which the instances are drawn, and are not meant to be universally applicable.

Kvale (1983), Beshai, (1975), and to a certain extent Romanyshyn (1978) have treated the analysis of behaviour and experience as a process which is hermeneutic as well as phenomenological. Hermeneutics is the discipline of interpreting texts and other cultural products (Radntizky, 1970, cited in Kvale, 1983, p. 185). Hermeneutics is based on the notion that the meaning of a text or experience may not be immediately obvious. While this point is not usually discussed explicitly, all phenomenological psychology in the van Kaam style is actually hermeneutic in that the participant generates a text, of which the researcher must discover the meaning. This idea is also expressed in Giorgi's comment that interrelationships among meanings are not always obvious, and that they may emerge during research (197[illegible], p. 100). Van Kaam (1968) also describes how the meanings of an experience, which are intially implicit and vague, through analysis become explicit (cf. Wertz 1986, p. 209).

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Kvale (1983) has outlined seven "canons" of hermeneutic method. These are: (1) the employment of the "hermeneutic circle", i.e., the practice of cycling between an interpretation of the text and the use of this interpretation to illuminate the meaning of the text; (2) the search for a "good gestalt" or inner unity of the text; (3) the testing of the interpretation against new portions of the text; (4) the autonomy of the text, i.e., the use of it to interpret itself; (5) the knowledge of the theme of the text; (6) the recognition that interpretation is not presuppositionless; and (7) the exercise of creativity in interpreting the text. These are not original to Kvale, but he has explicitly recommended that they be applied to phenomenological psychology.

Heidegger also referred to his philosophical project of the interpretation of being as hermeneutic (Heidegger, 1972; Orth, 1984). Existential categories are often recommended in CPP methodological prescriptions as frameworks for interpreting experience. This is implicit in the masthead of the JPP which indicates that "The challenge facing us is to invent methods that will unveil significant aspects of man's relatedness to himself, others, and the world". This notion that experience is linked to others and to the world parallels (in other language) Heidegger's concepts of being-in-the-world and being-with-others. Wertz (1986) has suggested the use of existential-phenomenological concepts as a guide for interpreting experience:

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> Another concept sometimes used by researchers is the self-world-others structure, which is believed to be involved in every psychological reality. "When a researcher hears a subject describe any one of these essential aspects of existence, he may then, following from this concept, reflect on how the other two are implicitly involved" (p. 211).

Hermeneutics implies that the phenomenological researcher does not just "see" the meaning of an experience in a protocol, but that he or she actively constructs this meaning. Also within the theme of the psychologist's active, non-objective engagement in research is the explicit recommendation of creativity in the interpretation of protocols. For example Alapack and Alapack refer to their research practice in their 1984 study on the experience of leaving home as "creating a symphony" on the topic (cf. Collaizi, 1978, p. 59).

While the search for the necessary and universal aspects of experience has been discussed above, CPP also acknowledges the contingent and particular features of experience. CPP theorists have discussed the historicity of phenomena, that is, their specificity at a certain place and time in particular lives (Giorgi, 1975, p. 101; Van Kaam, 1968, p. 72). The effort to retain this concreteness

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results in accounts of experience which reflect their real richness.

Related to this is the biographical emphasis of CPP. Psychological phenomena are taken to be personal, and the experience of the subject is understood in these terms (Giorgi, 1975, p. 101). Von Eckartsberg (1971) identified this recognition of the situatedness of experience with the ecological perspective: "Experience is always somebody's unique experience. It is given to the unique individual who is living a unique life in concrete situations and who has achieved a dynamic balance in his everyday life-praxis" (p. 69). Another feature of the phenomenological view of the subject is that it is holistic: Humans are studied as they live, and their unique features are not analyzed reductively (Giorgi, 1967, p. 171).

However, it is important to distinguish between the notion that each experience is unique, and the notion that each experience is historically constituted. Phenomenologists have claimed both, and the two are somewhat contrary: They represent different emphases, one pulling toward finding common meaning at the level of the culture, and the other pulling toward finding particular meaning at the level the individual experience or the specific biography. And both of these emphases involve a degree of contingency which is contrary to the universality and necessity implied by the search for essences or general

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structures of experience. The compromise among these notions is represented by von Eckartsberg's comment that "In the realm of experience we cannot deny that human experience is unique although there may be common structural principles and even shared experiences" (1971, p. 68).

Within CPP, the concepts of validity and reliabilty are redefined. Collaizi (1978) interprets objectivity as faithfulness to phenomena, in this case, the recognition of experience as experience (p. 52). Similarly, the criterion of psychological knowledge is understanding (Collaiazi, 1978, p. 56, which seems to mean here, empathic understanding). Validity is achieved through an attitude of "respectful openness to the whole of our existence which allows, through an involvement in the world, reality to reveal itself the way it is" (Sardello, 1971, p. 64). Shapiro (1986, p. 177) identifies the harmony of the researcher's evolving formulation of the account and a felt meaning for it as reliability, although this seems more analogous to validity.

Reliability consists of the persistence of meaning found in an experience across various instances and through circumstances (Wertz, 1986, p. 200). The position commonly taken with respect to verification is that it is intersubjective, that is, it reflects agreement between the researcher and other people (Shapiro, 1986, p. 178). Similarly, replication is intersubjectivity, that is, it is

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found in the ability of various researchers to replicate the general themes of an analysis (Giorgi, 1966; Sardello, 1971, p. 64). The criterion of validity, although this seems more like reliability, is whether the reader can, from the same viewpoint as the researcher, see what the researcher saw (Giorgi, 1975, p. 96, but cf. 1989). Checking reliability consists of seeking discrepant sources of data, including those from other sources, to correct apparent meaning, provided that this includes intuitive identification of new meaning.

While the type of analysis exemplified in van Kaam (1958), Giorgi (1975) and Collaizi (1978) is the method most frequently discussed by CPP methodologists and most frequently employed by CPP researchers, it should be noted that it is not this method which defines CPP from the viewpoint of CPP methodologists. Rather, it is the general perspective that informs research (e.g., concern with experience, bracketing assumptions, inclusion of all aspects of the participant's report, search for universal and necessary features) which makes CPP what it is. In fact, CPP methodologists have stressed that there is not just one phenomenological method (Collaizi, 1978, p. 53).

Collaizi briefly describes two research methods other than the one of analysis of protocols and research interviews. The first is the observation of a lived event followed by a description of that event. The second is the

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imaginative presence of an event followed by phenomenological reflection upon it (1978, pp. 62-68). However, the explanations of these procedures are quite brief.

Summary

The literature which has exerted the most influence on the practice of CPP has been two pieces of research intended only to be examples of how phenomenological research might be done. These provided examples of an emprical and hermeneutic version of phenomenological psychology in which a researcher interviews one or more subjects, then performs an analysis on their accounts of an experience to discover general themes. This basic method has typically been assumed rather than advocated by most methodologists. Issues which have received more careful attention include the value of the phenomenological reduction, the respondent's experience of the research situation, methods of obtaining rich and veridical accounts of experiences, and the degree of authority to be permitted a subject in interpreting his own experience. Existential frameworks have been advocated for use in interpreting protocols.

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Chapter Three:

Results of A Content Analysis of Twenty-Four Phenomenological Psychological Studies

Introduction

The purpose of the research presented in this chapter is to determine the methods actually used in phenomenological research in psychology in North America from the initial publication of the *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* (*JPP*) in 1970 through 1986. This source was selected to represent contemporary phenomenological psychology (CPP) because it is the only journal published in North America which is devoted primarily to research in phenomenological psychology. It is particularly representative of the phenomenological psychology of Duquesne University, as this the location of its publication, and most of the journal's editors and many of its contributors were educated there, or are members of the faculty in psychology or other departments. Because the *JPP* includes some papers written and/or edited outside of North America, it is also partially representative of phenomenological research abroad. This time period was selected because it represents most of the period during which the graduate programme in psychology at Duquesne has been in existence, a period which has not been treated in previous historical and critical publications (e.g., Kockelmans, 1970; Spiegelberg, 1972)

Method

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The *JPP* publishes research of several different kinds related to phenomenological psychology, including philosophical, historical, and methodological papers, as well as psychological ones. Only papers primarily concerned with psychological questions were eligible to be selected for the present study. Psychological questions were understood here as being those pertaining to the behaviour, action, or experience of humans or animals. (Because phenomenological psychology, as described by Husserl and as practiced today includes a priori methods, the papers selected cannot be correctly characterized as "empirical". For a discussion of the meanings of "empirical" and "a priori", see Chapter One.) In order to be included in the pool to be sampled, papers did not need to include a clear description of the method the researchers employed, although in most cases such a description was included.

The sampling procedure was designed to select a group of papers representative of the entire duration of the *JPP's* publication, from 1970 and through 1986. First, the psychological articles in each volume which met the criteria described above were identified. The total number of psychological articles was 48, with an average of 2.82 articles per issue, and a range from zero (volume 11) to seven (volume 12). Following the creation of the pool, one article was randomly selected from each volume, for a total of 16 articles. Then from the eight volumes which contained three or more psychological articles a second article was

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randomly selected, bringing the total sample to 24 articles. Therefore, years in which a larger number of psychological articles were published (relative to other years) are represented by a larger number of articles in the sample. The 24 articles in the sample represented 50% of the total pool of articles eligible for selection. For a list of the articles selected, see Appendix B.

Each of these articles was then given a content analysis. The recording units, that is, the segments of the text treated as individual elements for the analysis, were themes (i.e., single assertions about some subject). The context units (the largest body which was searched to characterize a recording) were complete articles. This means that to clarify the meaning of any statement, every reference to the same theme in the article in which that statement appeared could be referred to if necessary (Holsti, 1968). For example:

> As a participant observer, I was a regular visitor of the school, who sat around in the classrooms during lessons, went out with the children and their teachers during physical education hours and playtime, etc. I remained in the background as much as possible, trying not to interfere with the things that happened among children, or between them and teachers. My role was known as that of a researcher who was there with the intention of

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> noting down and trying to understand what was going on (Coener, 1986, p. 6).

In this example, the theme is the researcher as participant observer, and the passage quoted was sufficient context to characterize this theme. Recording units were not counted (i.e., their frequency within a particular article was not recorded) because it was the researcher's use of a method, rather than the frequency of its mention, which was of interest. However, the number of articles in which a particular theme appeared was counted, in order to determine how typical that theme is in the method of CPP.

First, all statements in each report concerning method were underscored and delineated in the text of the report by marking them with a slash. Then all of the statements which concerned the method actually used in each report were recorded on a checklist on a content analysis form (see Appendix A). The categories and the options within categories used to create the checklist were drawn from three sources: (1) an initial reading of the 24 studies themselves; (2) Husserlian phenomenological psychology; and (3) contemporary prescriptions for phenomenological psychology cited by the authors of the 24 studies, such as methodology articles in the JPP (see Appendix C). The page number of each theme was recorded, and where authors identified a source for part or all of their method this was also noted.

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The content analysis form also included a "Notes" space for residual comments which did not conform to the checklist categories. In instances in which the author did not explicitly describe his or her method, the premises and conclusions which were included in the relevant portion of the paper were underscored and noted in the margin of the text and in the "Notes" section of the content analysis form. An effort was made to understand the meaning each author intended by the use of ambiguous or technical terms such as "free imaginative variation" by attending to how the author defined the term, or what research practices the term was actually used to designate, where such practices were described. The authors' original language was preserved as far as possible in the content analysis form, and in the text of the results presented here. Statements concerning method which did not apply to the research actually reported in the article, including criticisms of the methodology of mainstream psychology, and general statements concerning metaphysics, ontology, or epistemology were not categorized in the content analysis, but were used to aid in the interpretation of the authors' research practices.

Results

Note: Numerals appearing in brackets indicate the number of articles to which the description of a given method applies.

General

The results of the content analysis revealed that few

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generalizations are applicable to the methods used in all of the articles. The authors of more than half of the articles explicitly identified their method as "phenomenological" (13). Others identified it as "phenomenological and empirical" (2), "empirical-phenomenological" (1), "existential-phenomenological" (1), or "phenomenological-hermeneutic" (1). The methodology was not identified in the remainder of the studies (6).

Possibly the only generalization which holds for all of the studies is that they concerned experience in some sense. The researchers variously characterized their subject matter as "experience" (10), "meaning" (7), "lived sense" (5), "phenomena"/"phenomenology" (4), "intentions" (3), "behaviour" (2), "experiaction" (1), "attitudes" (1), "apprehension" (1), or "consciousness" (1). Several researchers used more than one of these terms. None described their subject matter only as "behaviour". In addition, several researchers characterized their subject matter more specifically. For example, Mitchell and the National Center for Primate Biology (1972) indicated that the general topic of their research was "intentions", but more specifically the topic was attention in "looking behaviour".

The goals of the research were also diverse. Most commonly, the researchers were concerned with describing many aspects of some phenomenon (17). Other goals were:

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testing specific hypotheses (4), identifying similarities between two experiences (1), and identifying the difference between :wo experiences (2).

While there were few attributes which characterized all of the papers, each one was very similar methodologically to a few of the others. Therefore, they have been grouped here into four categories. The dimensions on which they have primarily been sorted are the locus of the experience described (researcher vs. participant), and the author of the initial description of that experience (researcher vs. participant). The interaction of these two dimensions captures the basic nature of any cognitive endeavour: the mode of access of the thinking subject to the object of knowledge. The interaction of these two dimensions generates four possible types of research: (a) The researcher describes the researcher's experience, (b) the participant describes the participant's experience, (c) the researcher describes the participant's experience, and (d) the participant describes the researcher's experience Of course, no cases of the fourth kind actually appeared.

The first type of paper, in which the researcher describes a personal experience or a free imaginative variation on an experience, has been given the title here of "traditional phenomenology", since this descriptive, reflective, often a priori type of research is most similar to that of Husserl.

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The second type of research, in which the participant describes the experience of a group of subjects has been split into two categories: The first is called here "empirical phenomenology," for its use of descriptions of actual experiences collected from groups of participants. The second, called here "experimental phenomenology", consists of explanatory rather than descriptive research. It is fundamentally different from all of the other papers which appear here because of the researchers' use of structured questionnaires which limit the participant's possible descriptions to themes selected by the researcher, and the use of inferential statistical analysis to interpret relationships between variables represented in these questionnaires.

The third type of research, in which the researcher describes the experience of the participant, has been called here "hermeneutic phenomenology" or "phenomenology of the other", because the participant is omitted from active involvement in describing his experience. The researcher discloses the experience of the subject by interpreting the subject's words, actions, gestures, etcetera.

These categories were intended to group the studies on the basis of the locus of the experience and of the description of that experience, but they also grouped the studies on other dimensions, such as the sources of their methods, and the logic of their generalization process (a

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priori vs. a posteriori), in ways which will be described below. Therefore, while these categories may not be "natural kinds", they do group entities such that the features which are not shared by all 24 papers but which are shared by any one group are common and peculiar to that group. That is, features are correlated within each group.

Traditional Phenomenological Psychology: The Researcher Describes His/Her Experience

As well as being the method most similar to the eidetic psychology of Husserl, traditional phenomenology was the earliest of the four types of of phenomenological psychology to appear in the JPP. Strauss, Aug and Ables published in 1970, von Eckartsberg in 1971, and van den Berg in 1975. Of the four types of research, this is the one with the greatest array of methods, and the one in which the method was least explicitly identified. Notably, Strauss, Aug, and Ables neither described their method nor presented much of the reasoning and observations behind their conclusions.

Each of these three groups of researchers described a psychological phenomenon: Strauss et al. (1970) attempted to clarify the basic problem of dyslexia by exploring the transformation of speaking into reading and writing; van den Berg (1975) inquired into the experiential difference between perceiving and imagining, and von Eckartsberg (1971) offered his reflections on a 20-minute period during which he prepared a lecture on the reflective method of research.

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The point of departure in two of these papers was was a concrete experience described by the author in the first person: Van den Berg's paper began, "A moment ago I heard a rooster crow ..." (p. 21). Von Eckartsberg stated, "In the situation it was me sitting alone on the sunporch. I felt that it was an everyday event, nothing unusual happened" (p. 162). In contrast, Strauss et al. did not offer a description in the first person of a specific event, and generally used the impersonal pronoun: "In order to spell, to write, and finally to read, not only must one break up such personal contact, but one must also master a series of shifts in attention," (p. 229). The absence of such an explicit first hand account makes the placement of this paper in this category somewhat problematic, however even Husserl did not typically describe the experiences submitted to the eidetic reduction in first person, concrete terms. Therefore Strauss et. al's research was included in this group because of its largely a priori approach.

The central method of these pieces of research was reflection.

> "Now I would like to go over this experience to amplify, dilate, and reflect upon it .... As I go along, reflecting on this experience, I try to discover the essential or universal aspects of the process of experience. These are exemplified in this unique-concrete reported event but they can

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be said to be valid for experiencing in general. This constitutes the reflective work, looking back and thinking about this experience, discovering meaningful patterns and structures, universal features that are lived out concretely in a unique fashion" (von Eckartsberg, 1971, pp. 165-166).

The content of this reflection is exemplified by passages such as this one from van den Berg's account of imagining the pantheon:

> "In my imagination I am hindered by nothing. In principle, in whatever I see, my imagination is not hindered by anything--until what I intended to see is right there ... They <the columns of the pantheon> <u>are</u> there, that is sufficient for my perceiving; that is also the only thing that I cannot get around in my perceiving" (1975, p. 134).

Reflection then included both the retention and the examination of an experience. For von Eckartsberg, reflection revealed the aspects of his experience which extended beyond the particular to the universal.

The authors described their experiences, after having reflected upon them. Von Eckartsberg, for example, described his experience of preparing a lecture as being embedded in "multiple contexts of meaning". While he was

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preparing "something for New College," he did, at the same time, "record an experience", (p. 167). The meanings of this act came from his life-project (p. 167). His experience "spilled over" immediate, physical time and space, to both a past meeting , and to a future lecture (p. 169).

Philosophical analysis, consisting of a consideration of the adequacy and clarity of certain theories of experience, was a feature of van den Berg's research, but did not appear in the other two papers. Van den Berg's criticized Descartes' account of the difference between perception and imagination (p. 122 ff.). Descartes had taken the position that while perceptions are images arising from outside the subject, imagined images are produced internally. Van den Berg objected that this distinction does not explain how the soul knows which of these two sources a particular image has arisen from, and that therefore some other basis must be found to explain our ability to distinguish between the two experiences.

Strauss et al. (1970) used an analysis of the relationship between the conditions of an experience, and the characteristics of the experience itself, in order to clarify its structure. They argued that in printed material, the text of a message is given simultaneously, that is, large portions of the text are given to the reader at once. Therefore, the temporal cues presented by speech,

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which is given bit by bit, are not present to guide comprehension. Because the reader must decode the text without these temporal cues, he must be able to distance himself from the immediate concrete situation and respond to its more abstract meanings. Combining this with a similar account of the difference between writing and speaking, and supporting their interpretation with some clinical observations, Strass et al. inferred that the essence of dyslexia is an attachment to one's immediate situation. The authors then proceeded beyond an a priori description of the experience of dyslexia to a set of inferences about what dyslexia must be, given the nature of the stimuli to which it relates, and the type of results it yields.

All three papers included the use of some empirical evidence gathered in clinical contexts. For example, Strauss, Aug and Ables observed that dyslexics have difficulty telling time, as part of their argument that the underlying problem of dyslexics is their difficulty in stepping out of the present concrete moment in order to locate it in an abstract temporal order (p. 231-232).

Strauss et al. (1970) and van den Berg (1975) used both laboratory research and anecdotal information from outside the laboratory. Examples include van den Berg's brief discussions of research on eidetic imagery, and the case of the painter Van Meegan who could "imprint on the mind" sheets of information then "read" it from the page (p. 125),

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and Strauss et al's comment that dyslexics are often good athletes (p. 235). But this information, like the clinical research mentioned above, is generally not described in detail or adequately referenced. It is unclear what information was gathered by the authors, and what came from other sources.

In all three of the papers, the authors used certain categories to thematize their reflections. They commented on the experience in terms of: social context (3), concrete/abstract distinctions (2), freedom/non-freedom (2), temporality (2), spatiality (1), possibility/actuality (1), life-project situatedness (1), and active bodily involvement/no active bodily involvement (1). For example, van den Berg (p. 130) remarked that one difference between imagination and perception is that socially, in perceiving he wished to "take the other along", while in imagining he realized that the object of his experience was private.

All three of the authors generalized from their findings, that is, they regarded the descriptions generated by their research to be applicable to most or all of the phenomena of the kind they described. The justification offered (or not offered) for this generalization varied from author to author. Van den Berg (1975) considered a number of possible descriptions of imagination, then considered whether or not the description was both necessary and sufficient to characterize consistently all instances of imagination, in

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both himself and others, including such anomalous ones as eidetic imagery. Although he did not use the term, this was an example of free imaginative variation. Strauss et al. (1970) generalized on the basis of the characteristics of speaking, listening, reading and writing, which are intrinsic to these media, and also apparently on the basis of the general clinical literature on dyslexia. Von Eckartsberg (1971) was unclear about how he was able to identify the aspects of the particular experience he described which were general. For example, he described how his thoughts went back and forth, then wrote, "In other words, any situated experiaction spills over its physical space/time dimensions, unless one is able to limit one's awareness by concentration" (p. 169). He seemed either to find generalizability given with certain aspects of his experience and discernible upon reflection, or to assume that what was pervasive and necessary in his own experience was also universal. Like van den Berg, he seemed to intuit the generality of his description.

Empirical Phenomenological Psychology: The Participant Describes His/Her Experience Freely

This category was the largest of the four, comprising 13 of the 24 studies analyzed. The dates of publication ranged from 1973 to 1985. The authors of these studies generally included a clear description of the method which they used in their research. This method was generally consistent from researcher to researcher: Voluntary participants

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provided an account of some experience. The researcher then reflectively analyzed these accounts. This resulted in a description of the structure of the experience under consideration. This approach will now be outlined in more detail.

The topics of the empirical phenomenological psychological papers reviewed here were: anxiety (Fischer, 1973), participation in research (Perrott, 1977), group decision-making (Faber, Nilakantan, Rothmeier & Zapf, 1978), poetry (Collier & Kuiken, 1977), anxiety aroused by the dying (Frank, 1978), fear (Arcaya, 1979), heart attack and the reconstruction of reality (Levy, 1981), failing to learn (Deegan, 1981), the premenstruum (Montgomery, 1982), experiencing oneself or another as old (Bors, 1983), leaving home (Alapack & Alapack, 1984), listening to Mahler's Ninth Symphony as an instance of perceiving meaning in music, (Osbourne & Kennedy, 1985), and guilt (Brooke, 1985).

In nearly all of these studies, several persons other than the researcher participated (12). Participants in the research were typically referred to as subjects, although some phenomenologists have objected to this practice, favouring terms such as "co-investigator" or "respondent" (e.g., Kruger, 1973). The number of subjects ranged from 3 (Perrot, 1977) to 84 (Collier & Kuiken, 1976). Frank's (1978) research, in which Simone de Beauvoir, through a piece of autobiographical writing was the sole subject, was

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the one exception to this use of many subjects. His study will be discussed separately at the end of this section.

Some of the researchers indicated that they attempted to approach their subject matter without bias, preconceptions, or presuppositions (3). They did not claim that they actually discarded all expectations concerning the outcome of their research, but rather that they attempted to suspend these and be open to any possible outcome. Others implicitly or explicitly expressed doubt about the possibility of presuppositionlessness, and instead attempted to articulate their assumptions at the outset of the study (2).

A minority of the researchers indicated that they selected only subjects who were articulate English speakers, who had participated in an experience of the type in question and were willing to discuss it (3), although it may be that this type of screening was generally the case. The participants were most frequently students (9); in at least two cases the researcher was the course instructor. Two studies involved populations necessitated by the topics of the research: mental health workers (Faber et al., 1977), and heart attack victims (Levy, 1981). In only a few studies did the author deliberately seek out a diverse sample of subjects (eg., both genders, a range of ages, various occupational groups and religious backgrounds) (3). None of the researchers collected or considered cross-

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cultural data. In one study, dealing with premenstrual experience, the researcher even restricted the sample to English-speaking female graduate students studying psychotherapy, in order to "allow patterns to emerge" (Montgomery, 1982, p. 246).

Typically, participants were asked to describe their experience in writing (8). In most of these cases the request itself was presented in writing (5). Participants were requested either to describe a particular experience (5), or a situation (3). The remainder were based on interviews, with either open-ended questions only (2), or a combination of open-ended questions and more specific queries (2).

The participants' written accounts of their experiences, or the transcripts in the case of the interviews, constituted a "protocol". The analysis of this protocol formed the core of the empirical phenomenological method. Each of the twelve researchers or teams of researchers described a predetermined procedure consisting of several steps for carrying out this analysis and/or referred to a source which described such a method. The source was either one of Giorgi's (9) or Collaizi's (2) publications, which were discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Consequently, the method of empirical phenomenology was relatively homogeneous.

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Some researchers held a set of protocols in reserve for validation of the description at which they aimed. The analysis typically proceeded as follows: First, the researcher read over the entire protocol in order to get a sense of its meaning (6). Osbourne and Kennedy (1985) indicated that they rejected certain protocols at this point which did not reflect the subjects' affective involvement in the music which provided the context for the experience they were describing. Brooke (1985) discarded protocols whose authors were not articulate English-speakers, who had not participated in the relevant experience, or who were not available for later follow-up.

Then, the researcher identified the "meaning units" (11). These represented small portions of the text, such as sentences or phrases, which contained distinct ideas. For example, Osbourne and Kennedy identified the following meaning unit in one participant's description of his experience of listening to a piece of music by Mahler: "I felt my body becoming more and more relaxed" (1985, p. 25). These meaning units were also called the "constituent meanings" (e.g., Deegan, 1981), or "intention units" (e.g., Faber et al., 1978).

Most frequently, in the next step the researchers grouped the meaning units by theme (6). For example, Osbourne and Kennedy (1985) grouped the meaning units into 19 clusters. One of these, (to which the meaning unit quoted above was

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assigned), was "Relaxation: The responses were characterized by a relaxed floating feeling resulting in a lessening awareness of the immediate environment" (p. 25). This grouping by theme generated lists of meaning units, each connected by commonality of content, but drawn from diverse protocols.

In a different method, following their identification, the meaning units were then grouped according to theme for each participant individually. These groupings were given various names, including "situated structure" (eg. Brooke, 1985) and "essential structure for one subject" (Osbourne and Kennedy, 1985). The use of the term structure here implies an interrelationship of the elements of the experience to form a whole. Osbourne and Kennedy grouped themes both within and across participants. It was at this situated structure stage that Montgomery, who interviewed each subject three times, integrated the material reported by each subject.

In either case, this process of identifying and grouping the meaningful elements called on the sensitivity and individual discretion of the researcher, as there obviously is no set algorithm for such a process. Several variations in technique appeared at the point of grouping the meaning units. Some researchers determined in advance the categories which they would use to group the themes, then assigned themes to them (2). Others simultaneously, or

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dialectically, detected similarities among natural meaning units and created categories (8). In other cases, the interpretive sequence was unclear (2).

It is noteworthy that the emphasis in grouping meaning units within participants and grouping meaning units across participants differs. The grouping of themes across subjects assumes a homogeneity of experience among subjects and an autonomy of meaning units such that a meaning unit can be abstracted from its context and retain its meaning, while the grouping of themes separately for each subject suggests that the experience of each subject is an integrated and possibly unique whole. Giorgi (1975) recommended both practices.

Finally, an "extended description" was created (10) (e.g., Brooke, 1985). This represented the experience of all the subjects in the study (10). Typically, the extended description was also represented as being characteristic of experiences of its kind in general. It was also called the "structural description" (e.g., Arcaya, 1979), the "inclusive description" (e.g., Collier & Kuiken, 1976), and the "general structural characterization" (e.g., Deegan, 1981).

Researchers varied considerably in their criteria concerning the number of participants who were required to include a theme in their protocol in order for that theme to be included in the general description. The establishment

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of a criterion for inclusion in the general description was another point on which each researcher was required to make an individual choice in method. Some of the researchers were at the inclusive or "liberal" end of the spectrum (2). For example, Osbourne and Kennedy (1985) created a "mosaic" in which any number of participants reporting material relating to a theme was sufficient to justify its inclusion; they found that each theme appeared in the protocols of from 2 to 14 of their 38 participants. Similarly Collier and Kuiken (1977) found that each theme appeared in 4% to 50% of their protocols. Others researchers were at the exclusive or "conservative" end of the spectrum (3). For example, Fischer (1973) included only the "invariant" elements in his extended description, Arcaya (1979) reported that his extended description was "applicable to all of the data" (p. 174), and Brooke (1985) regarded his summary assertions as literally "definitive" -- "That is, if any one of these constituents is missing, then that experience is not understood to be one of guilt" (p. 37). Intermediate between these two criteria some researchers included themes if they were reported by several participants (3). Bors (1983), for example, stated that his description was transituational, if not necessarily universal. Other researchers were unclear about their criteria for inclusion in the general description (3).

As well as seeking the general structure of a phenomenon two of the researchers made more specific comparisons

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between groups of participants. Levy et al. (1981) categorized accounts of experiences surrounding myocardial infarction as reflecting either success or failure of reconstruction of pre-infarction experience, then performed a chi-square test to find the relationship between this variable and the likelihood of the patient having plans for his future life. They found that the two were directly related. Faber et al. (1978) qualitatively compared the characteristics of teams with a unit process and style versus those with an individual process and style, and found differences in their level of satisfaction as well as other areas. Consequently, each of these two studies in effect generated two general descriptions (although they were not termed such), one for each of the groups in question.

The process of analysis which the researchers described was not simply one of summarizing. As has been noted, the researchers' discretion entered the analysis in the identification of the natural meaning units, the grouping of these units into themes, and the identification of some of these themes as general. Some of the authors de-emphasized their own activity, indicating that the meaning "emerged" from the protocols (1), or that they "saw" the constituents (1). However most authors indicated a more active process of interpretation. Most frequently the researchers report that they "reflected" on the protocols (5). They also described their activity as dialoguing (4), interpreting (3), grasping essences or structures (3), abstraction or

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extraction (3) engaging in free imaginative variation (2), or uncovering structures (1). Some authors used more than one of these terms. It was not always clear to which stage an author referred when indicating that he or she performed one of these activities. Alapack and Alapack (1984) were particularly emphatic about their own involvement in forming an interpretation. They employed free imaginative variation, verstehen, imaginative awareness, and exegesis in "orchestrating a symphony about the meaning of leaving home" (p. 45)

A minority (4) of the researchers sought some form of validation for their interpretation: Two read their general description of the experience to the subject for confirmation, one had another researcher verify his interpretation against the protocols, and one did both.

The researchers varied somewhat in their view of the significance of the description which their analysis produced. Most described the result in terms which implied generality, and the interdependence of a set of constituents (9). These terms included: "essence"," structure"," essential structure", "structural essence","general structure", "universal structure", "invariant structure", "invariant features", "hypothetically typical experience", "limit-case", "nascent-sense", and "normative description". (Several used more than one of these terms.) The remainder described the results of their research simply in terms of

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the diverse themes which they uncovered (3). As well as including a description of the inter-related general features of a phenomenon, some researchers also described variation or exceptions to this general description (3).

There was one exception to the above description of the empirical phenomenological method: Frank (1978) based his discussion concerning the sources of anxiety aroused by the dying and the development of an authentic attitude toward death on an autobiographical text by Simone de Beauvoir, and on the reports of the patients of Kubler-Ross (1969). He did not use any systematic summarizing procedure. Instead, he presented themes within this experience chronologically as they appeared in de Beauvoir's work, incorporating Kubler Ross' insights as he went.

The authors organized and interpreted the results of their research within various frameworks. Most frequently employed were the phenomenological philosophy or psychology of Husserl, Schutz, or CPP researchers (8). Of these, several researchers organized their discussion in terms of the participants' experience of time, space, the world, body, and social integration, or some subset of these (4). For example Montgomery (1982) organized her discussion of the premenstruum in terms of body, time, world, and social integration. She opened her description of the experience of the world in this way: "Withdrawal into a softer, vaguer inner world carries with it a heightened sense of the outer

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world's harshness and heightened internal conflicts may sensitize her to problematic external events" (p. 52).

Also common was the use of the existential or proto-existential philosophy or psychology of Schopenhauer, Simone de Beauvoir, or Buber (8) as a framework. Some authors used both existential and phenomenological frameworks. Both existential and phenomenological sources were usually cited explicitly but, when they were not, the sources of the concepts from these movements were still apparent (e.g., "life-world" as a Husserlian phenomenological theme, "authenticity" as an existential theme.) Some researchers made use of psychological sources other than existential or phenomenological psychology in their discussion of the results (4). Only two researchers employed neither existential nor phenomenological theory in their interpretations.

The description of the analysis given above holds true for 12 of the cases of empirical phenomenological research; their methods were quite homogeneous, and deviations from the norm have been indicated as the discussion proceeded. Therefore, this section exemplifies a general description, in which the most frequently appearing themes, as well as the variants on these themes, have both been included.

Experimental Phenomenological Psychology: The Participant Describes His/Her Experience In A Circumscribed Way

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Three studies were classified as experimental phenomenology. Their dates of publication ranged from 1974 to 1977. The first was Yonge's research on the relationship between the content of gender stereotypes and dynamic images of male and female movement in our culture (1975). The second was Spitzer's test of an "ontological model" of anxiety derived from the writings of Kierkegaard and Laing (1977). The third was Rosen's demonstration of an instance of non-Euclidean visual perception (1974).

The common element in these three pieces of research is that each of them used a method in which an experimenter created a situation, then required participants to respond to it with a self-report selected from a limited number of possible responses which the researcher regarded as relevant. Like empirical phenomenology, experimental phenomenology is a form of research based on the experience of a participant rather than that of the researcher. But it differes from empirical phenomenology in that empirical phenomenology permits the participant greater spontaneity and therefore a greater range of responses in expressing his experience. Yonge's (1975) and Spitzer's (1977) studies will be considered first, then because Rosen (1974) used a somewhat different method from these first two researchers, his work will be considered separately.

Yonge identified his method as "empirical and phenomenological"; Spitzer did not explicitly label his

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method, but based on his selection of a journal for publication it can be assumed that he regarded it as phenomenological in some sense.

Both of the studies were tests of specific hypotheses, but in neither case did the hypothesis take the form of a claim for efficient causation. Rather, the hypotheses concerned relationships of mutual implication between two psychological attributes in one case, and between connotations of verbal and non-verbal stimuli in the other case. This kind of relationship is most similar to formal causation. Both hypotheses were derived from sources which are within the tradition associated with phenomenological psychology: Yonge (1975) derived his hypothesis from Buytendijk's explication of the dynamic images of masculinity and femininity in our culture; Spitzer (1977) tested an ontological model of anxiety which he derived from Laing's view that excessive reflectiveness is the result of a fear of non-being and the subsequent effort to reassure oneself of one's existence. It is only in the existential-phenomenological source of their hypotheses that these studies differ from others which might be called "non-phenomenological".

The authors of both studies produced operational definitions of the concepts contained in their hypotheses, that is, they interpreted them in terms of observables. (Spitzer actually used the term "operationalize", while

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Yonge did not.) In Spitzer's hypothesis, "anxiety," "awareness of self," and "concern with being" were measured by the contents of responses (in the cases of anxiety and dissatisfaction) and the forms of responses (in the case of reflection) on the Twenty Statements Test, while for Yonge participants' beliefs about "masculine and feminine as typical in our culture" were measured as increments which participants checked off on an adjective check-list. In this way, the researchers sharply circumscribed the range of responses they regarded as meaningful for their studies.

The relationships between independent and dependent variables implied in these theories were interpreted by the researchers as significant differences between average measures of these operationalized concepts. For example, in Spitzer's (1977) work the hypothesis which was tested became one concerning individual differences. Laing's idea that reflection is a means of self-assurance concerning existence was translated into the prediction that reflective individuals would be more anxious individuals.

Both authors employed large numbers of subjects in their research: 74 in Spitzer's study, 33 in Yonge's. Spitzer's subjects were new patients with diverse diagnoses undergoing screening at a psychiatric clinic, while Yonge's were educational psychology students.

The hypothesized relationships between the variables were measured statistically. Spitzer divided subjects into two

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groups based on measured anxiety, then performed a Z-test on the dependent variable "reflectiveness" and found significant differences in the expected direction; he obtained similar results with the other hypotheses in the model. Using an F-test, Yonge found that adjectives frequently rated as masculine were also frequently rated as descriptive of a jagged line, while those frequently rated as feminine were also frequently rated as descriptive of a curved line.

The use of inferential statistics to discover relationships among dimensions of experience placed these relationships outside of the domain of possible extended description by the participants. Therefore, the most important aspect of these studies was not a phenomenon for the participant, but rather it was an inference that the researchers discovered relatively independently. In this respect, the researcher's approach was akin to mainstream experimental psychology.

Rosen's (1974) research differed from Spitzer's and Yonge's in that it did not include the results of data-gathering on the part of the author; in fact it was somewhat unique and anomalous relative to the four categories discussed here, in that it included some features of traditional as well as experimental phenomenology. One traditional phenomenological feature of his research was that Rosen opened his demonstration of non-Euclidean visual

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perception with philosophical argumentation. He drew attention to the importance of non-Euclidean geometry in sciences other than psychology, and interpreted relativistic physics to claim that the contour of space is relative to the context of its postulation. He concluded that this precludes realism. He then drew attention to realist assumptions in perceptual psychology, and argued that the demonstration of non-realist perception would provide justification for setting these aside.

As the experimental part of his research Rosen (1974) included in his article a diagram which was a variation on the Mueller-Leyer illusion, consisting of a curved line between a pair of points which appears shorter than a straight line between another pair of points equally far apart. In both cases, the distance between the two points is 6.4 cm; the length of the short, straight line is 6.4 cm, while the length of the long, curved line is 6.7 cm. To the present author, the curved path between the two points appeared slightly shorter, supporting Rosen's view. This demonstrated a violation in perception of the Euclidian axiom that the shortest distance between two points is a strait line, showing that realism is an inadequate metatheory for the psychology of perception.

By stating that this "is" a case of non-Euclidean perception without stating whose experience this conclusion is based on, Rosen has made the basis of his claim unclear.

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He did not describe the experience of any participants in his study, making its place in the "experimental phenomenology" category ambiguous. Rosen's description of the illusion suggested that he himself was a participant. By including the diagram, Rosen implicitly invited the reader to also take the role of a participant. Also, while Rosen did not mention it, his use of the Mueller-Lyer illusion as the basis of his proof builds on the empirical support for the effectiveness of that illusion.

As in the two previous studies the researcher created a "stimulus", and the participant could select one of a limited range of possible relevant responses (either line A is longer, line B is longer, or both are the same). Furthermore, the possible significance of these responses was determined by the researcher in advance.

Phenomenology of the Other or Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Researcher Describes The Experience of the Participant

Five studies have been assigned to this category: Keen's paper on his five-year-old daughter changing her mind (1972); Mitchell et al.'s study of looking behaviour in the rhesus monkey (1972); Coenen's (1986) discussion of movement, perception and expression in deaf children; Dolis's (1986) paper on the language of responsibility; and Eng's (1984) discussion of experience of the world in aging and psychosis. The dates of publication ranged from 1972 to

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1986.

The definitive feature of these five pieces of research is that while there were subjects, they had little or no opportunity to describe their experience. Instead, the researcher described this experience on the basis of the actions, gestures, and expressions of the subjects, hence the title, "phenomenology of the other". The persons in whom the experience is located are present in the initial description of the experience as "he", "she", or "it". This differs from traditional phenomenology, in which the researcher is the "I" of the initial description, and from empirical phenomenology, in which the subject is the "I" of the initial description which is then analyzed by the researcher.

One reason for this omission may be found in the choice of subjects of the research. The subjects in these studies were individuals who were unwilling or not readily able to articulate fully their own experiences to the researcher verbally (4): rhesus monkeys (Mitchell et al., 1972); a five-year-old (Keen, 1972); deaf children (Coenen, 1986); and psychotics (Eng, 1984). Also, some researchers were concerned with largely preconscious or subconscious lived meanings (2). For example, Dolis uncovered the demand for recognition implicit in the demand for an explanation of another's behaviour. This concern with experiences which cannot be verbally articulated to the researcher may be one

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reason for this phenomenology of the other.

Most of the studies concerned experiences which took place in natural settings (4). For example, Coenen (1986) collected the material for his study during a year-long participant observation in a school which housed both deaf and non-deaf children.

In each of these five papers, the researcher observed the subjects in their setting (5). These observations pertained to behaviour ranging from simple actions which signalled intentions, for example aggressive gazes in rhesus monkeys, (Mitchell et al., 1972) or mood, for example, a child crying (Keen, 1972); to iconic gestures, for example, a child's imitation of a monster (Coenen, 1986); to purely verbal communication (Dolis, 1986; Eng, 1984). These actions were sometimes communicative behaviour related to the experience, but they were not _about_ the experience. It was the interpretation of these observations, and the attribution of general implications to these interpretations, that constituted the work of these pieces of research.

One of the most frequently used interpretive devices in these studies was one in which the researcher seemed to enter imaginatively into the experience of the subject in order to understand it better (4). This practice has been called elsewhere, _Verstehen_ a German word meaning "to understand". None of the authors explicitly indicated that they attempted to do this, however it was apparent in their

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practice. For example, Coenen (1986) described how on one occasion, each child put a piece of orange peel into his or her mouth and made claws and faces and began to run around the playground; in this he saw the children as conjuring an imaginary world. Similarly, Mitchell et al. described how, after observing monkeys for a time, "the observer almost begins to feel what the monkey's emotional state must be" (1972, p. 55).

Verstehen implies a comparison to the self in the formation of understanding. To enter into another's situation in order to comprehend it is at the same time to assume that the response to a situation of the other is like one's own response. Keen compared his daughter's behaviour to his own in order to interpret her experience. He noted that while he would have been too ashamed to come home from an overnight outing, his daughter was not. This implied that unlike himself, his daughter had no Other in her interpersonal space in which her experiences occurred (1972, p. 169).

Context was also an important clue to the experiences of the subjects (4). Dolis (1986) described an interaction in which a man stumbled into his home, drunk, after a night out with the boys, then passed out. This illuminated the meaning of his wife's question, "What do you think you're doing ?" Coenen (1986) paid particular attention to the way in which looks were integrated into practical body movements

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in situations in which children requested help (p. 11).

The researchers made use of the function of the subject's action in interpreting its meaning (4). Keen wrote of his daughter, "She very efficiently produces behaviour to produce an approximation of that past" (1972, p. 163), that is, her crying succeeded in getting her home, implying that it was her past experiences at home which were on her mind before she came home.

Keen also compared his daughter's behaviour in various situations to infer what she was experiencing. He noted, for example, that since she had not been distressed by being in her friend's room before, the fact that she was on this occasion showed that it had taken on a new, alien aspect for her (1972, p. 165).

The phenomenology of the other was largely a hermeneutic approach to understanding the experience of the subject. Hermeneutics here is understood as an interpretive enterprise in which the researcher attempts to uncover the meaning of an author or speaker through examination of cultural artifacts such as texts, dialogues, works of art, and so on (Kvale, 1983). Hermeneutics and phenomenological psychology differ in that phenomenological psychology is primarily an attempt to describe experience, while hermeneutics is the effort primarily to interpret a text. The two are alike in that both aim at discovering meanings which are not immediately obvious, and the two are

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complementary in that when the experience under consideration is not that of the researcher, it may be approached by way of the subject's communicative utterances and products. In empirical phenomenology and experimental phenomenology, that creation (the protocol or the questionnaire response) was offered by the subject as a description of an experience, and the intention of the subject was to communicate that experience. In the case of the phenomenology of the other, the nature of the experience is interpreted from actions and words which may originate from, but were not necessarily intended to be about, that experience.

The hermeneutic approach was used to interpret a range of communicative acts of varying degrees of complexity and explicitness. The sorts of behaviour which the researchers interpreted in these studies will be examined by using the linguistic categories of index, icon, and symbol. The distinction among these acts was discussed by Charles Pierce and propogated by linguists such as McNeill (1979).

An indexical sign is one which is causally connected to the object it represents. For example, when the hackles rise on a dog, this is a signal of its anger. The use of signals given by the subject to interpret experience occurred in two papers. In Mitchell's study of looking behaviour as attention, the researchers made use of the context of the monkeys' looking, and the object to which it

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was directed, in order to infer their mental states. This interpretive process was supported by the fact that observers were already able to predict informally monkeys' behaviour from these subtle cues. For example, preadolescent female monkeys' long gazes at infant monkeys, combined with maternal behaviours such as lipsmacking were interpreted as interest (p. 60). Similarly, Keen (1972) interpreted his daughter's mood using signals such as tears.

One form of the index is the act of pointing. Coenen (1986) made use of the indexical gestures of the children in his study to infer their experience, including the children's flexible use of indexical movements in order to fill the gaps in their knowledge of the grammar and syntax of sign language. For example he described how a little boy used reaching movements, looks, and pointing to borrow his chair and request a piece of paper, and interpreted these as an integrated part of the child's practical bodily movement in obtaining these items (p. 10).

An icon is a sign which resembles the object which it represents. The children in Coenen's study made extensive use of sign language. Sign language is partially iconic. Also, they generated their own icons, as in the example of the game in which the children pretended they were monsters. Coenen uncovered the children's experience on the basis of their iconic communications.

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Most frequently, the researchers interpreted the truly symbolic verbal communications of their subjects (4). A symbol is a sign which refers to its object by virtue of a law. A language is a system of symbols shared by some community. The most straightforward form of linguistic interpretation employed in the research reviewed here was based on the self-reports of the subjects. The only researcher who incorporates this sort of information is Eng: He described the comments of psychotic patients, including a woman who felt that she had been turned inside-out like a glove so that her vicera were now on the outside of her body (p. 21), and a man who said "Thank you for being with me in the underworld" (p. 22), as well as several who referred to themselves as "half-dead" (p. 22) in order to show the relationship between psychosis and the sense of impending death.

More often, researchers had to "read between the lines" of subjects' comments. Sometimes, this simply meant uncovering the psychological meaning implied by a comment which was not a self-report, using "common sense" psychology. For example, on the basis of his daughter's wondering aloud how soon her friend would call concerning an overnight visit, Keen (1972) inferred she was in a state of anticipation about this visit.

In some cases the construction of an interpretation was a more elaborate process: Existential hermeneutics was

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prominent in most of these pieces of research (4). Dolis (1986) and Eng (1984) made extensive use of Heideggerian existential hermeneutics, while Coenen relied more heavily on the work of Merleau-Ponty. For example, Dolis began to interpret a wife's question, put to her drunken husband, "What do you think you're doing ?" by asking, "Yet what complaint is being lodged here ?" (p. 33). He then developed an interpretation of this question as an appeal to the husband to speak to the questioner and thereby to acknowledge her existence (p. 35). In interpreting this exchange, Dolis (1986) implicitly made extensive use of philology. He hyphenated many of the words in his article, or put portions of them into parentheses in order to draw attention to their original meaning, such as "(i)re-sponsibility," and "(a)mend." This analysis of language was in keeping with the Heidiggerian aphorism, "Language speaks" (p. 37), or reveals the structure of being.

Summary

Twenty-four research articles spanning the period from 1970 to 1986 were randomly selected from the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and subjected to content analysis concerning the research methods they represent. Results show that recent studies in phenomenological psychology can be divided into categories with respect to method, primarily according to the loci of experience and description. In traditional phenomenology the researcher describes his own experience. The researcher retains his

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experience and reflects on it to attempt to discover the universal structure it represents. In empirical phenomenology the research subject describes his own experience. The researcher collects several such accounts and uses reflective and content analytic procedures to discover their essential structure. In experimental phenomenology, the subject also describes his experience, but only severely circumscribed aspects of it. It is identical to the method of mainstream psychology in its use of operational definitions and interpretation guided by inferential statistics. In the phenomenology of the other the researcher describes the experience of the subject, taking advantage of the transparency of the subjects behaviour to imaginatively share their experience, and interpreting the signal, indexical, iconic, and linguisitic behaviour of the subject using indigenous, phenomenological, and/or existential hermeneutics.

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A Comparison of Research Methods In Contemporary and Husserlian Phenomenological Psychology

Introduction

The purpose the fourth chapter of this thesis is to compare Husserlian phenomenological psychology (HPP) and contemporary phenomenological psychology (CPP), identifying the major similarities and differences between the two systems. In comparing the two phenomenological psychologies the present chapter will be based upon the characterizations of HPP and CPP which have been developed in the previous three chapters.

The relationship between the two forms of psychology is explored in two ways: One is a comparison of the methodological prescriptions themselves. This includes the identification of actual citations of Husserl concerning issues of method by CPP methodologists. The second is the comparison of the actual research practices to which these prescriptions are attached. This comparison of specific practices is useful because it provides clarifying examples of methodological terms, particularly where various theorists may use the same term to mean different things. It also compensates for differences that may exist between methodological prescriptions and actual research practices.

A comparison of HPP and CPP must take into consideration that there is not only one kind of contemporary phenomenological psychology. In Chapter Three, four general

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types were identified: traditional, empirical, experimental and hermeneutic phenomenological psychology. Since traditional and experimental phenomenological psychology are relatively rare and readily characterized, they will be discussed first. The remainder of the discussion will be organized according to the themes which define Husserlian phenomenological psychology (HPP): the primacy of phenomena, the intentionality of psychological acts, description, essentialism, and ap iority.

Traditional phenomenological psychology comprised only 3 of the 24 studies examined here, and these appeared early in the history of the JPP. The type of research identified in Chapter Three as traditional is essentially like that of Husserl. Both take as their starting point the experience of the researcher. In both types of research, this experience is subjected to a reflective analysis (in effect, a free imaginative variation). Both result in a general description of the phenomenon in question.

A few elements were present in the studies identified here as traditional phenomenological psychology which were not present in HPP. Notably, CPP researchers interpreted their reflections using concepts such as situatedness in the life project (e.g., von Eckartsberg, 1971) which are the result of post-Husserlian hermeneutic and existential trends in phenomenology. This trend toward hermeneutics is also found in empirical and hermeneutic phenomenological

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psychology and will be discussed at greater length below.

Experimental phenomenological psychology is an anomaly of kind as well as number, in that it was represented by only three studies in the sample and its methods differed markedly from both HPP and from other forms of CPP. It resembled Husserlian psychology only in that it took experience as its subject matter. It differed from HPP in its use of prepared stimulus materials, inferential statistics, and causal hypotheses. It was, in effect, wholly a posteriori, and concerned with specific relationships among phenomena, in contrast to the general descriptive purpose of HPP. Experimental phenomenological psychology differed from experimental psychology only in that it drew its hypotheses from existential phenomenology. Because of its rarity and its discontinuity with the rest of CPP, it will receive little further attention.

The other two types of CPP, empirical phenomenological psychology and hermeneutic phenomenological psychology, constituted the bulk of the studies reviewed (18 out of 24). Empirical and hermeneutic phenomenology require detailed comparison to HPP because while the two types of phenomenological psychology differ markedly, there are definite historical and logical connections between them. The two forms of CPP will largely be discussed together in the following sections. This is possible because the defining features of the two approaches are shared in

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common: it is the relative importance which the two give to these defining features which differentiates them, as well as the fact that in empirical phenomenological psychology the individual subject describes an experience personally, while in hermeneutic phenomenological psychology the researcher describes the experience of the individual (see Chapter Three). Both include an empirical element, in that each draws on instances of actual experience or behaviour for authority. Furthermore, both include some hermeneutic elements in that both interpret reports or expressions of experience.

The Primacy of Experience

In both practice and prescription, the philosophical basis of CPP methodology continues to be the Husserlian belief that truth and reality lie in phenomena and not behind them. CPP epistemology is consciously based on the slogan, "Back to the things themselves" (Collaizi, 1978, p. 56; Giorgi, 1985, p. 8). Consequently, as in HPP, causal explanation in CPP is de-emphasized in favour of description; it is introduced only after experiences have been documented in as unbiased a manner as possible. Related to this notion of the primacy of experience is the continued faith among phenomenologists that humans have access to a scientifically useful proportion of mental events. Conscious experience is focal in CPP.

This does not imply that either Husserl or contemporary

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phenomenological psychologists regard all psychological events as equally accessible to consciousness. Husserl discussed experience which had been lived, but which has not yet been reflected upon (PP, p. 116). This theme in Husserl's thought is compatible with the focus on the implicit aspects of experience which can now be found in hermeneutic phenomenological psychology although the hermeneuticists have taken this to a greater degree than did Husserl; this will be discussed below. It can also be found in empirical phenomenological psychologists' continuing focus on the development of techniques which will allow research participants to access their experience in fuller and less biased ways (e.g., Aanstoos, 1983; Kvale, 1983).

A Shift in the Meaning of "Intentionality"

Like Husserl, CPP methodologists continue to identify intentionality as defining the domain of psychology and credit Husserl with identifying intentionality as the essence of the psychological (e.g., Aanstoos, 1983, p. 253; Barrell and Barrell, 1975, p. 65; Giorgi, 1970, p. 156). In research papers, phenomenological psychology is often defined simply as psychology which is concerned with experience (Chapter Three). The two formulations, the mental as experience and the mental as intentional are equivalent from a Husserlian point of view. CPP researchers also continue to examine some of the relatively private aspects of experience, distinguishing HPP and CPP on one hand from methodological behaviourism on the other. For

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example, of the 24 studies reviewed in Chapter Three, 20 deal with relatively private experiences such as guilt, fear, and the premenstruum.

However, while CPP methodologists continue to equate the psychological with the intentional, they have actually shifted the meaning of intentionality by focussing more on the public manifestations of phenomena to which phenomenological methods are applied. In his own research Husserl dwelt primarily on relatively individual and private experiences such as time consciousness (Husserl, 1964; hereafter PITC) and perception (PP). He did indicate that the intentions of another are given to the observer through language, actions, facial expressions, and artifacts (PP, p. 85). But intentions publicly manifested by the body in relation to the world were not actually studied by Husserl.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty elaborated Husserl's view by treating the person as an extended subject, that is, by treating the body as a whole as the ego (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The body itself reveals intentions, so they are not private to the agent. Phenomenological methodologists incorporate this broader notion of intentionality and attribute it to Merleau-Ponty (Collaizi, 1978, p. 64; Giorgi, 1970, p. 83 van Kaam, 1966, p. 21; von Eckartsberg, 1986, p. 14).

In order to stress this public dimension of experience phenomenological psychologists have adopted terms such as

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experiaction to stress the unity of behaviour and experience (von Eckartsberg, 1971, p. 166). In CPP this broader conception of intentionality has actually been put into research practice: CPP methodologists regard participants' reports of their experiences as the public aspect of those experiences, and not as representations of them.

Therefore, a shift of emphasis has occurred: Husserl treated experience as primarily private, while CPP methodologists have treated it as also public. This has implied the most significant single change in the practice of phenomenological psychology since the time of Husserl: the experience which is studied is now no longer that of the researcher, but that of someone else.

From The Experience of the Researcher to The Experience of the Other

For Hu   erl, it was the experience of the researcher which was initially described then employed as the first exemplar in free imaginative variation. While Husserl occasionally applied phenomenological reflection to a society as a whole, (Husserl, 1965/1935), his classic studies of spatial perception (PP), and time consciousness (PITC). were based on eidetic reflections upon his own intentional acts.

But for CPP, it is the experience of the other which is typically the initial object of study. As was stated in Chapter Three, most of the 24 studies reviewed were based

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partially or wholly on the experience of participants other than the researcher. Researchers have obtained access to the experience of subjects in two ways: In the first, exemplified by empirical phenomenological psychology and experimental phenomenological psychology the researcher gained access to the experience of the participant through the participant's written or spoken description of this experience. This mode of inquiry is similar to traditional, Husserlian phenomenology in that the person in whom the experience inheres is given the opportunity to describe it. But the analysis of that description is carried out by a researcher.

The second way in which the researcher uncovers the experience of the subject is hermeneutic phenomenology, in which the researcher constructs the description of the internal aspects of the experience solely on the basis of its external manifestations (see Chapter Three). The account of the agent is effectively passed by. The agent communicates as part of the experience, but does not communicate _about_ the experience. Therefore, hermeneutic phenomenological psychology is one degree further removed from HPP than empirical phenomenological psychology, in that in the latter the description of the experience originates in the subject; while in the former it originates in the researcher.

From Description to Interpretation

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Phenomenological psychology continues to be descriptive for the most part, in the sense that it does not attempt to be explanatory. This is apparent in both the prescriptions (Chapter Two) and the practices of CPP (Chapter Three). Only a few researchers have used phenomenological psychology to investigate causal relationships (e.g., Levy, 1981). However, consistent with the shift in emphasis from the study of private experience to the study of public experience, and from phenomenology of the self to phenomenology of the other, there has been a shift in emphasis in the work of the researcher from the description of experience to the interpretation of the signs or expressions of an experience. The shift from description to interpretation takes two different forms, again corresponding to empirical and hermeneutic phenomenological psychology.

In empirical phenomenology the task of interpreting an experience now falls on the researcher who must work from an oral or written description, so analysis is no longer carried out by the person in whom the experience inheres. The (temporally) initial focus of the researcher has shifted from the experience itself to what is said or written concerning that experience. Description alone is not enough, since a text rather than the object of the text is now given to the researcher. As the researcher engages subjects' reports of their experiences, then the researcher is forced to interpret them in some way. Therefore

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description has been replaced by hermeneutics in the form of qualitative analysis.

From a hermeneutic viewpoint, this is typically a simple content analysis in which statements concerning an experience are identified, categorized, enumerated across participants, and summarized (Chapter Three). In order to construct a general description, the researcher first must infer which elements are essential and what are accidental to a particular instance of an experience.

This sometimes is done by by treating the reports of participants as empirical variants within a larger series of real and fictitious variants generated by the researcher (Chapter Two; Chapter Three). In this case, the procedure is close to that of HPP in that it is an a priori process of eidetic reduction in which a few of the variants happen to be empirically inspired. This is particularly true in those cases in which the researcher attempts to relive the experience of the subject as she analyzes it. Or, in a variation on HPP, the researcher may treat the accounts provided by subjects as empirical variants, and try to obtain a synthesizing insight into the essence of the phenomena without adding fictitious exemplars (Andrew, 1985, 1986). Therefore, phenomenological techniques are still in play, although they are intertwined with hermeneutic ones. Or even more remote from the free imaginative variation of HPP, some researchers may simply engage in induction.

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As well as identifying the essential elements of the description, the empirical phenomenological researcher also must identify the meaningful relationships among these elements at second hand. As was indicated in Chapter Three, the researcher frequently abstracts elements from across a number of different accounts. Through this abstraction, the context of each statement is lost as data (although researchers may note these relationships). Also, the interrelationships among these elements is muted in those cases where the inclusion or exclusion of each element occurs in isolation (Van Kaam, 1958). Therefore, while modern methodologists mention structuredness of the general description, this structuredness must be largely inferred rather than intuited, since it obtained from mediated experience from data whose internal coherence has been attenuated. This represents another departure from the method of HPP.

Various researchers differ in the extent to which their analyses were active rather than passive. The emphasis which methodologists have placed on articulating the method of analysis again and again, and the occasional use of extra researchers to check the reliability of interpretations suggest a concern with avoiding idiosyncratic interpretations. However, other researchers have emphasized their creative activity in forming interpretations (Chapter Three).

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This time-consuming content analytic method is the most frequent in CPP, and since it is not found in Husserl, nor in traditional or contemporary European phenomenological psychology, CPP must be regarded as something different and partially discontinuous from what was traditionally viewed as phenomenology. The historical reason for this shift from the direct to the mediated description of experience is unclear, but the fact that seminal methodologists such as van Kaam (1958) and Giorgi (1983) have stressed that phenomenological psychology is as empirically rigorous as mainstream experimental psychology suggests an interest in appealing to the standards of experimental psychologists for credibility. This could explain why most CPP researchers imitate the former's methods through verificationist research strategies. (More recently, Giorgi has argued against trying to appeal to empiricist notions of evidence (Giorgi, 1989)).

The need for the researcher to interpret the participants' comments is the result the deliberate use of volunteers who are untrained in the phenomenological-psychological method. In Chapter One the painstaking process of HPP research was described, including the phenomenological reduction followed by the detailed description of the constitution of the experience, including the relationship between its noetic aspects and its corresponding noematic aspects, among the experience's noematic acts, and among its noetic aspects. Other

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phenomenologists (Reeder, 1986, Spiegelberg, 1973,) have emphasized the importance of acquaintance with some phenomenological literature, care and repeated practice in carrying out phenomenological reflection. As a result of this type of rigor, the results of phenomenological research provided by Husserl are quite detailed and cohesively structured. In order for this type of analysis to be possible it was necessary for the same person who had had the experience to reflect upon it.

In contrast, research participants in CPP are untrained in reflection. Because they lack phenomenological background, they do not carry out a Husserlian style analysis. In lieu of carrying out the phenomenological reduction, they follow instructions by focusing on experience, refraining from speculation, and staying close to the topic. Similarly, as in the phenomenological reduction, they are asked to refrain from explanations of the experience. No instructions are given as to how to articulate the experience itself. Therefore the modern reflection approximates the phenomenological reduction, but not the other features of Husserlian reflection. This relationship between the locus of the experience and the form of analysis which is employed illustrates how each departure from HPP produces further departures.

Hermeneutic phenomenological psychology similarly is a mode of research which has a limited resemblance to HPP. As

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has been stated, there is a Husserlian basis for describing intentions on the basis of the comments, gestures, and actions that accompany or express these intentions and for probing beyond the immediately conscious aspects of an experience. It can even be argued that HPP must be hermeneutic in that all knowledge, in some sense, involves interpretation. Husserlian phenomenology is interpretive in that a priori structures are encountered, but are initially hidden in that they are not immediately construed. They must be disclosed using phenomenological methods (Nickelson, 1984).

But interpretation in hermeneutic phenomenological psychology differs from HPP in several ways. Most importantly, the underlying metaphor is different in hermeneutics and phenomenology. Phenomenology takes appearences as the object of its method. Husserl's most frequent illustrations of methodological principals were based on sensory examples, such as colour, or unicorns. The essence itself is "intuited" or "seen." By studying its objects as if they were sensible, phenomenology treats its objects as if they are physical.

But hermeneutics studies its objects as if they were textual. Historically the initial task of hermeneutics was to interpret ancient documents. Later, hermeneutics of culture, existence, and so on were added. While Husserl used some quasi-linguistic terms such as "meaning" to

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describe the objects of phenomenology, (Orth, 1984), for the most part he used quasi-natural terms. Moreover, hermeneutics does not focus on the experience as much as on the text that experience generates. The author of a piece of hermeneutic phenomenological psychology may make few explicit claims about the experience of the subject itself, giving the text itself equal (Coenen, 1986) or greater (Dolis, 1986) attention.

Also, phenomenological psychology, with its concern for appearences, focuses primarily on what is given, although it may probe for less explicit meanings. But hermeneutic psychology is inferential. The meanings it seeks are typically hidden rather than perceived. The researcher does not necessarily take the subject's own description of an experience as immediately adequate, and may apply "common-sense", critical, and theoretically-based interpretations of the subject's own descriptions of the experience. The effect of this may even be to invert the subject's own interpretation of this experience in some instances (Kvale, 1983, p. 182).

Even more significantly, while Husserl and the hermeneuticists would agree that interpretion is active, Husserl would deny that it is creative in any partially arbitrary sense. Regardless of what series of variants the researcher generates, there is only one essence which can possibly be intuited (Chapter One). On the other hand,

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hermeneutic phenomenological psychologists are quite explicitly creative in their interpretations (e.g., Kvale, 1983, p. 187).

Finally, as with empirical phenomenological psychology, hermeneutic phenomenological psychology favours the study of a broader range of phenomena than HPP. By allowing a single episode to be the focus of a study, it facilitates the study of phenomena which do not clearly have necessary, universal structures, and especially those which are ephemeral or elusive, or rare (Dolis 1986) and bound to a highly specific situation (e.g., Levy, 1981). Also, this method does not depend on the person in whom the experience under under consideration occurs being either a researcher (as HPP does) or a willing and articulate research participant (as empirical and experimental phenomenology do). The participants may be unaware they are being studied (e.g., Coenen, 1986), have difficulty articulating their experience (e.g., Eng, 1984 Keen, 1973;), be unconscious of, or even reluctant to discuss aspects of their experience.

<u>Continued Essentialism</u>

CPP is similar to HPP in that both are essentialistic. This essentialism manifests itself in practices and prescriptions which implicitly or explicitly are based on the assumption that experiences fall into natural kinds, each of which has universal, necessary, inter-related features. First, the research prescriptions of CPP include overt endorsements of

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essentialism (Chapter Two).

More importantly the actual research practices of CPP are equally essentialistic. As was noted in chapter three, CPP includes the employment of a priori methods to describe types of experience. A priori description is based on insight into the necessary features of a phenomenon. This notion that phenomena have necessary features characteristic of their type is equivalent to the claim that they have essences. An example of an a priori method which illustrates this essentialism is free imaginative variation, as discussed in Chapter Three.

Another a priori method which appears in empirical phenomenology is the process of "knowing all by knowing the one" (Alapack and Alapack, 1984, p. 45). It would only be possible to know all by knowing the one if any exemplar of a type of phenomena possessed the significant features of the rest, that is, if these features were universal. Again, this is equivalent to essentialism.

There are also implicit indicators of essentialism in CPP. It appears in the use of natural language terms ("folk psychology" or "common-sense psychology") to designate psychological phenomena when selecting topics for research or posing questions to subjects about an experience. The research papers reviewed in Chapter Three concern topics revealing their basis in North American indigenous psychology: studies of guilt, fear, anxiety, etcetera. This

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assumes that corresponding to the term the researcher employs there is some discrete kind of experience with common and distinct features. In fact, an inspection of the topics of phenomenological psychological research reveals the assumption that almost every situation has some distinct type of experience typically associated with it. This is a version of essentialism more naive than that of Husserl: He pointed out that essences may not correspond to the categories implicit in language (CM, p. 71). He indicated that it is necessary to reflect upon each apparent essence before concluding it is genuine. Also, he indicated that not every instance which initially appears to correspond to a certain essence will necessarily be a genuine exemplar of it. On the contrary, discarding irrelevant examples is an integral part of the method of free imaginative variation (PP, p. 61). In contrast to this, CPP researchers may choose to interview subjects on a specific topic in order to define a kind of experience (e.g., van Kaam, 1958).

Essentialism is also implicit in the common practice of collapsing accounts of experience from various respondents together into an essential description or general description. Generally, researchers do so even when the elements combined are not present in all, or even most, of the accounts (Chapter Three). This reflects the assumption that the experiences of all of the subjects were fundamentally the same, even when this similarity is not born out in their accounts.

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Another piece of evidence for implicit essentialism is found in the tendency to generalize widely from small, unrepresentative samples. This assumption that the experiences of a small group of persons, mostly from a narrow demographic range represent the experiences of people in general reflects the further assumption that each person's experience is really like each other person's, in short, that psychological phenomena have universal structures. This generalization process takes place in all four forms of CPP (Chapter Two).

This essentialism is an integral part of CPP. The existential view that existence precedes essence implies that each experience has features which are particular, contingent, and historically and biographically situated; and CPP researchers and methodologists acknowledge these (Giorgi, 1975, p. 101; van Kaam, 1968, p. 72). However, essentialism is the basis of most aspects of the research practice of all four forms of CPP. This essentialism is inevitable, because a descriptive psychology which treated each experience as essentially unique would refrain from generalizing its conclusions in any way. This type of psychology would be trivial, because it would fail to produce the systematic knowledge which renders experience intelligible. Without this systematic knowledge, psychology would fail to be useful for application to therapy, education, and so on.

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From Pure Intuition to Induction

Recall from Chapter One that HPP is a priori in two interrelated respects: First, it is a priori in its generation of fictional instances during free imaginative variation. Secondly, it is a priori in that closure is brought about on the series of variants on the basis of a necessity which is itself seen; that is, the series is not exhaustive, but is intuited to be sufficiently complete.

CPP continues to include a priori processes in research. Several CPP methodologists have also recommended the use of Husserlian free imaginative variation (Chapter Two). In Chapter Three, it was indicated that traditional phenomenological psychology included some use of eidetic reduction. And while empirical phenomenological psychological research consists largely of inductive procedures, three of the researchers also indicated that they made use of free imaginative variation. Similarly, in hermeneutic psychology some researchers generalized broadly from samples of one (or none ? e.g., Dolis, 1986).

However, there has been a general shift to a posteriori research. This is most obvious in experimental phenomenological psychology (Chapter Three). It is also apparent in the use of actual cases, and references to clinical and empirical research in hermeneutic and traditional phenomenological psychology. And not only do researchers in empirical phenomenological psychology

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actually use the term "empirical" to describe their research (e.g., Giorgi, 1975) but some regard the validity of their conclusions as partially a product of the number of participants they employ (van Kaam, 1958).

In itself, the employment of real cases from research subjects does not represent a serious break from HPP. As was discussed in the previous section, the inclusion of empirical instances is not contrary to the practice of eidetic intuition. As Chapter Three shows, CPP includes a spectrum of combinations of a priori and a posteriori methods. However, most CPP research relies more on empirical evidence and less on intuition that did Husserlian research.

Kenneth Andrew argued for "empirical phenomenology" on a Husserlian basis in a two-part article in the _Journal of Phenomenological Psychology_ (1985, 1986). He reviewed Husserl's discussion of empirical essences, largely from _Phenomenological Psychology_ and _Cartersian Meditations_. These empirical essences are distinguished from ideal essences in that the acceptance of the existence of the variants occurs; these essences apply only in relation to empirical extensions (PP, p. 63). On the basis of these and other passages, Andrew argues for the employment of an empirical phenomenology through the translation of Husserl's general method into an empirical analog (1985, 1986).

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The passages from Husserl's work which Andrew cites do support the notion that as well as the ideal, universal essences which can be discovered through free imaginative variation, there are also empirical essences limited to groups of actual instances (eg. PP, pp. 59, 63, 69, 75-78; CM, pp. 10-11, 59, 70). These appear if the researcher "secretly" imposes limitations to the real on the multiplicity of variation. However, these essences of specific sets of actual exemplars were clearly a second choice for Husserl. This is because an empirical essence would lack necessity and universality, so it would not necessarily apply to any objects other than those upon which its discovery was based.

Some authors have interpreted Husserl in a way which implies a greater similarity between HPP and CPP on the a priori/ a posteriori issue than is indicated here. They have played down the differences between the phenomenological and empirical methods. For example, Zaner (1978) has argued that Husserl gave varying degrees of emphasis to the a posteriori and the a priori in different publications. Merleau-ponty claimed that Husserl in his later years moved beyond the distinction between fact and essence (1964, p. 93), and toward the view that essence is as contingent as fact, and any knowledge of a fact involves an a priori understanding of essence (p. 72). According to this view Husserl also renounced the "dogmatic solution" of "apodictic evidence" (p. 76). Merleau-Ponty also took the

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implication of Husserl's position to be that essence-seeing is homogeneous with induction, and noted that Husserl comments that scientists who purport to be doing induction are actually engaged in ideation. But he notes that he is "pushing Husserl farther than he wished to go himself" (p. 72).

Regarding the claim that the work of the *Crisis* is incompatible with Husserl's earlier eidetic approach, there is no convincing support for this interpretation in Husserl's last work. In this last book, Husserl directed his attention to the historical character of objects, which places bounds on the duration of the actual appearence of these objects in the world. He stated that the duration of the actualization of essences in the world is of unknown limit (Cr, p. 53). But this does not imply an abandonment of essentialism, since it was always Husserl's view that the empirical instantiation of any essence may be limited or nil. Also, in *Crisis*, Husserl showed the breadth of his essentialism by subjecting history itself to eidetic examination. In this book, the essences of consciousness were still a topic of inquiry (Carr 1970, p. xxxvi; Husserl pp. 251-257, 377, Appendix V, p. 349). Finally, while Husserl revised several of his works late in life, including *Phenomenological Psychology* in 1928 and *Cartersian Meditations* in 1933, he did not substantially alter the portions of these books dealing with eidetic intuition or remove them.

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With respect to Merleau-Ponty's comment that Husserl regarded induction as homogeneous with eidetic intuition, this is quite true, but the point of Husserl's comments was not that essence seeing is a posteriori, but rather than induction has a priori elements, in the closure of sampling, in generalization, and in interpolation. It is not that intuition is equivalent to, or is a species of induction, but that induction, on close examination, turns out to exemplify incomplete eidetic intuition.

Similarly, some phenomenological psychologists interpret Husserl as having made clear distinctions among empirical psychology, transcendental phenomenology, and phenomenological psychology in Phenomenological Psychology and other early writings. But they further believe that in Husserl's later writings he regarded phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology as not distinct, and intended the project of phenomenological psychology to have an empirical basis in his later writings. But this interpretation is doubtful (Kockelmans, 1970, p. 154-156). Again, this distinction was supported by Husserl's last book, and the distinction was strongly made in books revised quite late in Husserl's life.

The position taken here then is that HPP really differs from CPP with respect to the relative importance given to a priori and a posteriori methods. In the same vein, Jennings (1986) has pointed out that while contemporary American

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psychologists often refer to any research which elicits and records subjective reactions as phenomenological, this title ought to be reserved for that type of research that analyzes the directed acts of consciousness in general. For example, an interview study on the reactions of white residents when a black family moves to their community is not phenomenological psychology. An analysis of the intentional acts of persons of any ethnic group and historical period toward a person of a different race or background would be phenomenological psychology.

While Husserl was concerned about the universality of the principles of phenomenological psychology, in modern phenomenological psychology the claims for generalizability of results have been more modest (Alapack and Alapack, 1984; Bors, 1983; Giorgi, 1975). CPP theorists are prepared to limit their descriptions to the experience of members of a specific sample. But paradoxically, the practice of employing samples as small as a single subject in some empirical phenomenological psychology (e.g., Frank, 1978; Giorgi, 1975) and hermeneutic phenomenological psychology (e.g., Dolis, 1986; Keen, 1975) implies a high degree of confidence in the generalizability of results.

Summary

The methodology of CPP differs from that of HPP in three fundamental, interrelated ways. While each alone is really

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only a shift in emphasis, taken together they amount to an effort to retain Husserl's essentialistic metaphysics and the portions of an aprioristic epistemology while adopting empirical methods. CPP emphasizes the public rather than the private aspects of experience. The result of this is the increasing tendency to move away from the experience of the researcher to the participant's description of his experience, and finally to the researcher's description of the participants experience. This has in turn resulted in a change in the process of phenomenological method, from description to interpretation, through the use of content analysis of participants' reports of their experiences, hermeneutics, and finally existential hermeneutics. At the same time, the logic of generalization has shifted from primarily a priori methods to a mixture of a priori and a posteriori.

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The Problem of Essence

In Contemporary American Phenomenological Psychology

Introduction

In earlier chapters, it has been shown that contemporary phenomenological psychology retains Husserlian phenomenological psychology's dependence on the concept of essence in both its prescriptions and its practice, although not always explicitly. It has also been shown that CPP partially retains the Husserlian a priori approach to disclosing essences in its practice and prescriptions, while extensively supplementing the a priori methods of HPP with a posteriori, inductive methods (see Chapters 2, 3, 4).

In the present chapter, it is argued that there are methodological problems in CPP arising from both its similarities to, and differences from, HPP. Objections will be raised to the claims that (1) there are essences for all psychological phenomena, (2) that these essences are accessible by HPP a priori methods retained by CPP, and (3) that they may be discovered using the present a posteriori methods of CPP. The first two of these objections will be introduced first through a critique of the internal consistency of Husserl's metaphysics and epistemology. Then, all three objections will be raised through a brief consideration of cross-cultural and historical research in psychology anu anthropology. These various objections each question the essentialism of HPP and CPP from various perspectives: metaphysics, epistemology, cross-cultural

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psychology, and historical psychology. Following this, the relationship of the problem of universals in psychology to the methodology of phenomenological psychology will briefly be discussed, and recommendations will be made to attempt to reduce the problems caused by essentialism.

Problems With Eidetic Intuition Intrinsic to HPP

This section will discuss problems intrinsic to the Husserlian approach to disclosing essences which continue to be relevant to CPP, as well as new problems which have arisen through the ways in which these a priori methods are employed in CPP.

In Chapter One, Husserl's view of essence was described through comparison to that of Plato. Plato had accounted for resemblances among things using the notion of the forms. According to the traditional interpretation of Plato, he argued that a form is a universal which is instantiated in each object of a certain kind, giving the object those properties which make it a member of the category to which it belongs. The forms themselves are "outside" of space and time, having their own existence independent of things. Thus the essences are real, even more real than particular objects. This position is called Platonic realism (Woozley, 1967).

The position most contrary to the doctrine of realism is nominalism, the idea that the only thing that members of a category share in common is a name. Nominalists believe

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that the only real things are particulars, and they object to "entities such as concepts, meanings, and senses in theories of meaning" (Eberle & Reidel, 1970). According to nominalists, categories are the result of human convention. Social constructionists, (a school of nominalists who have influenced historical social psychology) have even claimed that each object has an equal number of attributes in common with each other object, and that logically, each of these attributes has the same weight with regard to classification (Shweder & Miller, 1985). This is the "principle of logical equidistance."

Apart from the extremes of nominalism and realism, there are various intermediate theories of universals and category membership, such as conceptualism. This is the notion that while all that exists in objects are their particular qualities, there are general ideas in the mind which correspond to these qualities. A second is resemblance theory, the notion that the basis of category membership is similarity among a number of individuals with respect to a group of attributes, even if these individuals do not share a numerically identical property in common. One version of this holds that it is congruent recurrences, that is, the repeated occurrence of certain features together which defines a category (Price, 1969). For example, the tendency for mammary glands, warm blood, and fur to occur together justifies the creation or recognition of the category "mammal." Similar to this is Adonsonian realism, another

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intermediate theory, which recognizes a continuum from artificial kinds to natural kinds. Natural categories are those which allow many predictions to be made.

A fourth option intermediate between realism and nominalism is the family-resemblance theory advanced by Wittgenstein. This is the notion that objects designated by a common term resemble one another, but that this similarity is not reducible to any single set of features common and unique to that group (Malcolm, 1967). Husserl's theory did not fit into either realism (since he denied that essences are causes) or nominalism (since he affirmed that essences are prior to names). It is most like conceptualism, except that he regarded essences as not simply ideas held in particular minds.

It can be seen that each position on universals and category membership has at least three related parts. The metaphysical part either affirms or denies the existence and causal power of real forms outside of space and time. The scientific part claims either that there are natural kinds, or that there is a logical equidistance among objects. The epistemological part claims either that to identify a group of objects as members of a category is to make a substantive statement about the objective similarity among the members of a group (realism) or merely arbitrarily to name a group of objects (nominalism).

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It is necessary that within a philosophy, the positions taken on these issues be coherent. In Husserl's philosophy, it seems that this is not the case. Discussion here will focus on an aspect of the metaphysical issue: whether or not, from its own non-realist framework HPP can be expected to disclose real similarities among objects. Later, the the scientific issue of whether or not the assumption that there are natural kinds is true of psychological phenomena will be discussed. The first of these bears on the validity of a priori methods in both HPP and CPP; the second bears on both a priori and a posteriori methods in CPP.

In chapter one, it was noted that Husserl rejected a view that essences have a particular existence, claiming that essence is not a metaphysical concept in his system but merely "epistemological", and that the essence is not prior to the instance. But this raises a profound problem for Husserlian epistemology. If essences are not metaphysical, then the notion that things fall into natural kinds has no clear grounding. If an essence is merely the "overlapping" of objects of a given kind, and not the source of the similarity among them, then some other reason must be found why the variety of objects which the term associated with this essence is expected to designate ought actually be the same. To put this more concretely, if there is no real form of anxiety which makes all episodes of anxiety alike, then some new reason must be found for why they need to resemble each other. To use an analogy, if all the houses in a

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subdivision are not built from a single blueprint (or if there is not something else relating them with respect to their attributes) there is no reason that they ought all be the same. The search in HPP and CPP for universal structures presupposes this kind of similarity.

To raise the same problem from the standpoint of knowledge, if there is no form which makes all objects of a certain kind alike, then there is no reason for the researcher to expect that the instances which the researcher encounters in the future will resemble those she has encountered in the past. Recognizing this inconsistency in Husserl's system, Moreland (1989) has argued that Husserl must be read as a realist, contrary to his frequent explicit statements.

In itself, this is the familiar problem of induction, and it could be dealt with using those methods directed at it, such as inferential statistics or a falsificationist strategy of research. However, the problem becomes acute when the researcher is proceeding a priori. An a priori descriptive science presupposes the existence of some commonality among instances. In the absence of a form or real essence to which the researcher might have access in some sense, or which at least might determine the nature of the objects the researcher is encountering, there is no reason why a phenomenological researcher ought to be able to intuit a necessary universal. If there is no essence to

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inform the researcher's concept of the phenomena and limit imaginative variations, how is that concept determined ? There is no apparent reason why anyone ought to possess a priori knowledge of this kind if there are no real forms. The denial of real essence is incompatible with the claim of a priori knowledge. Instead of improving the Platonic theory of essences by rejecting realism, Husserl actually created a weaker theory.

One way out of this dilemma is to interpret Husserl as an idealist. If Husserl were to claim that objects inhere in the mind, then he could meaningfully claim that essences do not exist outside of objects, and at the same time account for the existence of universals by claiming that the transcendental ego infuses certain groups of objects with similar features, making them members of a single category.

At first glance, it appears that Husserl in fact took this route out of his dilemma: He discussed "constituting" objects, an activity in which the the subject, having suspended belief in the spatial and temporal object, reflects on the intentional acts through which the object is is given both its sense and its being (Husserl, 1982/1913; Morriston, 1976). But Husserl clearly indicated that he intended "constituting" to be merely subjective and not transcendental. Furthermore, had Husserl opted for idealism, this choice would itself have created problems. First, it would be unclear how the individual could ever

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have a mistaken belief if he actually constituted the world through his intentions. Secondly idealism would represent an unwarranted move from the recognition that the object as an intentional object is subjectively constituted to the belief that the object as a real object is intentionally constituted. Such a move would be inconsistent with phenomenology's basic principle (Morriston, 1976). To put this objection another way, from within the epoche it is just as inadmissible to assert that an object is ideal as it is to assert that it is real.

These two related ambiguities in Husserl's philosophy (essences as both real and nominal; sense and being as both real and ideal) reflect a general methodological problem in Husserl's philosophy which has been identified by several philosophers, including Farber (1967), and Pivcevic (1970). They have argued that from within the transcendental reduction, it is impossible to re-establish the existence of the (spatial-temporal) world and of other egos. The above considerations reveal that Husserl's method generates as much trouble at the level of establishing the essences of objects as it does establishing the necessity of the object's existence. It seems that there is no way to account for the relationship between the structures of possibility as these are seen through reflection, and the nature of real objects.

A second problem which arises even if Husserl's

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metaphysics of "epistemological" essences is granted is the issue of whether or not all objects actually instantiate necessary, universal structures. He painstakingly did make such a case for the principles of mathematics and logic, and the intentional acts through which they are apprehended. But while alluding to essences of history and culture, he did not explain why all the phenomena studied by the social sciences should have essences.

A third critique concerning the a priori knowledge of essences which arises from within HPP is that even if it is the case that the phenomena of the social sciences are governed by essences, this may provide only marginal knowledge of reality because essences are only structures of possibility. In some domains the structure is "tight": there are few possible variations among objects of a certain kind; the number of essences in the domain is small, and these few essences are frequently actualized. Therefore, it is highly informative to know something about these essences. The axioms of geometry are a good example: Very large numbers of real objects conform to a small set of precise geometrical principles. But it is logically possible that in other domains the formal structure is "loose": there are few rules governing possibilities; the number of possibilities is large; very few possibilities are unthinkable. In other words, each object might be unique and logically equidistant from each other object; there may be no natural kinds. The knowledge of this structure could

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be as trivial as the principle of non-contradiction. An example of such a domain is that of mythic creatures. If psychological phenomena are of this kind, then a priori knowledge in this domain would be of little intellectual or practical use.

This problem is exemplified by Van Kaam's seminal 1958 study on the experience of feeling really understood by another person. The general structure of the experience, as his 365 subjects expressed it, was little more than a restatement of the description of the experience implied in the researcher's question, so that his conclusions nearly constituted a tautology (see chapter 3). Presumably, the subjects in this large group had experienced many phenomena of diverse kinds. Van Kaam's questioning elicited accounts of a certain kind. Those which did not quite exemplify the type entailed by the question were weeded out. Then the variations among those which remained were distilled out through a process of content analysis. What remained had little similarity beyond that entailed by the question. This is because there may be no definite distinctive phenomena accompanying such an occasion.

To clarify this complaint, imagine a geometer suggesting that there is an essential structure of peanut-shapedness. The geometer asks students to bring in 365 peanut-shaped objects. These are then analyzed for similar elements. Size, colour, texture, and so on are eliminated as elements

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of peanut-shapedness. Finally the geometer concludes that all peanut-shaped objects are narrow in the middle and bulge at both ends. This is trivial. The important discovery would not be that there is a universal structure for a certain irregular shape, but that since there is no definite manifold which produces discrete kinds among irregular shapes, many similar exemplars of any shape one cares to imagine can be found. The evidence that psychological phenomena generally are "loosely structured" will be discussed below.

To summarize, three criticisms have been raised concerning HPP claims to a priori knowledge of psychological essences: The first is that because Husserl denied the priority of essence to instance, there is no reason why objects ought to fall into natural kinds discernible by intuition. The second is that Husserl never attempted to make a strong case for universal, necessary structures of psychological phenomena, except in the case of cognitive and perceptive acts. The third objection is that if psychological phenomena do have a structure, then this structure may be too loose to generate substantive psychological knowledge. These objections can be considered a brief, internal critique of phenomenological psychology. All three concerned the adequacy of Husserl's theory of knowledge in relation to his metaphysics. All three objections will be discussed below as they emerge from empirical research on culture's constitutive role for

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consciousness.

Other Problems Involved in Eidetic Intuition in CPP

There are also problems which attach to the process of actually trying to intuit essences a priori. Some of these are common to both CPP and HPP, while others only apply to the methods typical of CPP. One of these practical problems intrinsic to HPP springs from its dependence on the imagination of the researcher. In order to perform free imaginative variation, the researcher must be able to imagine variations on an instance of a phenomenon. She or he need not imagine every possible variant, but must be able to generate sufficiently extreme or exotic examples to test the limits of the category. But the imagination of the researcher is not unlimited: It is constrained by both personal experiences and theoretical prejudices. In fact Merleau-Ponty (1961/1964) discussed correspondence between between Husserl and Levy-Bruhl following the publication of Primitive Mythology (1935/1985) in which Husserl expressed doubts that phenomenological research could generate sufficient options through imagination alone to contact all the possibilities of human experience. He suggested that the data of anthropology are needed to show the breadth of possibilities.

Another practical problem that has characterized both a priori and inductive research methods in CPP, but which is not intrinsic to HPP, is the assumption that the terms of

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folk psychology, or of some other more elaborate psychological theory, correspond to essences. This practice is evident in studies in which a phenomenon is selected for study prior to reflection on that phenomenon. This assumption is also reflected in researchers asking participants to describe their experience of X, where X is some psychological term, then treating the data they collect as referring to a single type of experience by combining meaning units or situated descriptions from various subjects into one extended description (see Chapters Three and Four).

Husserl indicated that the essence is "prior to all 'concepts' in the sense of verbal significations; indeed as pure concepts these must be made to fit the eidos" CM, pp. 61, 71). It is not legitimate to suppose that each psychological term refers to one and only one kind of experience, with common and peculiar features. A researcher cannot suppose that every kind of experience, from fear to leaving home to reading poetry has its own essence. Consequently, from a Husserlian viewpoint it may be necessary to revise our vocabulary of psychological terms in order to correct any misconceptions and inadequacies implicit in both natural language and in psychological theories.

A second problem created by deviations of CPP from HPP methodological rigour is the use of eidetic reduction in a way that seems to be less rigorous than that of Husserl.

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Three of the researchers indicated that they had used the method of free imaginative variation (see Chapter Three). The rest, while they did not indicate that they used free imaginative variation, without appealing to systematic induction, did indicate that they found essential or universal elements in their description.

One example of the dubious use of "free imaginative variation" appears in Alapack and Alapack's (1984) study of the phenomenology of leaving home. The authors' hypothesis was that "...to execute the departure is a key developmental task, a turning point, centrally significant to the life journey of North Americans," (p. 46). Later the authors add, "Let us affirm that separation from home is an issue even for those who do not know it," (p. 50). Later, "I affirm that the precondition for an authentic homecoming is to leave home irrevocably," (p. 61), and "at the phenomenal level we must break through the natural attitude, the taken-for-grantedness that our own souls are rightfully co-owned by our parents, just because they gave us birth, and that our own lives will be interlinked with family tradition," (p. 62).

This is the product of Alapack and Alapack's free imaginative variation. However, since free imaginative variation is supposed to yield necessity, it ought to withstand intersubjective comparison. The reader is invited to reflect on whether or not leaving home irrevocably is a

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condition of authentic adulthood. In performing my own fr^e imaginative variation on the topic of leaving home, I do not find it inconceivable that one might leave home sincerely, while anticipating a return to home at some later date. Circumstances such as war, immigration, CU$ service, and so on might necessitate this kind of separation. I can also envision instances of leaving home, but continuing to experience one's life as "interlinked" with family tradition. As well as generating such imaginary instances, two actual cases come to mind of unmarried people who remained at home well into middle age caring for aging parents, an activity which suggests the authenticity of their adulthood rather than the opposite. Hence, it is difficult to affirm Alapack and Alapack's findings.

The Alapacks regard the "the taken-for-grantedness that our souls are rightfully co-owned by our parents, just because they gave us birth" a result of the unreflective natural attititude (p. 62), and characteristic of those who have not yet left home authentically. Yet, if birth is the primary basis they can conceive of for "co-ownership" by our parents, perhaps they have wrongly described the experience of family membership as an adult, and of adulthood itself. It is possible that for many it is the consistent intertwining of lives throughout childhood and adolescence which constitutes the "co-ownership" of lives within a family.

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It seems that it is Alapack and Alapack, with their assumption that authentic adulthood is attained by an "irrevocable" breach with family traditions, rather than a maturing sense of membership, who display a pre-philosophical attitude: Arguably, it is the experience of economic membership in a market based, consumer society, most characteristic of upper-middle class professional families which permits the autonomy of the nuclear family from the extended family and of the individual from the nuclear family (Dizard and Gadlin, 1984). To accept uncritically this highly situational path of development as an existential a priori, even for North Americans, is itself the apotheosis of the natural attitude. The point here is not to discard Alapack and Alapack's research, but rather to illustrate how CPP researchers do not attain the degree of rigour demanded by an a priori method and exemplified by Husserl's own research.

Part of the reason for this departure from Husserlian rigour may be nature of the phenomena with which CPP researchers now deal. As was indicated in Chapter Four, while Husserl addressed primarily relatively private, simple cognitive acts, current research is often directed at more interpersonal, and therefore more complex acts. This makes the process of eidetic reduction more difficult to apply. Moreover, (it will be argued below), these interpersonal acts seem to be most subject to cultural and historical variation, and therefore are unlikely to have any specific

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necessary structure. This lack of a necessary structure renders the eidetic reduction impossible to complete.

To summarize the preceding criticisms, free imaginative variation in CPP, as in HPP, depends heavily on the doubtful assumption that the imagination of the researcher is bound by nothing except the intuition of essential limitations on the extension of a concept. Second, CPP has departed from Husserlian rigour in its practice of assuming that the concepts of folk psychology correspond to the essences of psychological phenomena. Third, CPP researchers appear to have departed from the traditional rigorous use of free imaginative variation.

Cultural and Historical Variation in the Structure of Psychological Phenomena

Some of the criticisms which have already been directed at CPP in the present paper have raised the question of whether or not there are universals, especially psychological universals, and if so, whether or not HPP is adequate to discover them, from a philosophical point of view. In particular, Husserl's inability to make a serious argument for psychological universals in all domains, the inadequacy of "epistemological" essences for generating psychological universals, and the looseness of the a priori structure of the psychological domain cast doubt on the existence of such universals. In any case, in the absence of a metaphysical account of the essences of psychological phenomena,

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discussion must proceed to the scientific question of whether or not psychological phenomena fall into natural kinds, as this is the minimal, necessary basis for accepting essentialism in psychology.

Objections have been aimed at the notion of psychological universals from within psychology. Historical variation and cross-cultural differences in psychological phenomena suggest that at least some such phenomena are not universal. Gergen has argued that there is great variation in psychology over historical periods:

> Most contemporary patterns of human interaction are subject to temporal decay or alteration....For example, concerns with democratic family life, existential despair and the search for life's meaning, and the sense of mass identification engendered by the media, have become focal within the lifetime of the discipline itself....Most important, however, when one takes into account the origins and alterations of interaction patterns and their psychological bases, it is clear that virtually all are expendable. That is, almost none seem to be demanded by the character of human nature itself. None seem to be genetically wired into the nervous system. Biology primarily seems to supply the limits of human action.... However, within these limits there is potential for near infinite variation

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(Gergen, 1984, p. 11).

As Aries (1962) and van den Berg (1961) have shown, the child has been discovered, and possibly even created, only since the Renaissance: In the middle ages young people took on the role of an adult as soon as they left a nurse or mother at about five years of age. Boys worked as apprentices, farm labourers or squires, while girls took part in all aspects of housework, then married at as young as eleven years. They participated in adult recreation, as well as religious life. They engaged in such adult behavior as the study of philosophy, Latin and Greek. And as van den Berg stresses, consistent with the adult role children played, they demonstrated real maturity in emotion and cognition in comparison to their modern counterparts (pp. 22-30). Other examples of phenomena that fluctuate over time are abundant. Secord (1984) found that over recorded Western history, the gender roles and status of women have ranged from disposable chattel to revered patroness. This implies a similar variation in attitudes toward women. And Verhave and van Hoorn (1984) have shown that since the Renaissance, the self has increasingly been understood in temporal terms.

One possible response to evidence for the historical relativity of experience is to argue that there are abstract psychological laws which hold true over time. This is what makes it possible for us to understand the experiences of

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authors and historical figures from the past. Historical social psychologists, on this view, have only shown that the way in which these abstract laws manifest themselves over time has changed (Schlenker, 1974).

It may be true that there are abstract psychological laws which remain the same over time. However, this response is not really relevant here. Even if these higher order laws do obtain, if they cannot be shown to determine directly and univocally the content of experience, they would not entail a constancy in the structure of experience. Experience is directed toward the lived world of the individual, and this lived world is a historical one. To put this another way, these abstract laws must be mediated by the more concrete order of actual historical conditions in order to determine experience. Therefore experience varies with these historical conditions. This explains why so much of extant psychology (cognitive development, aesthetics, attribution, personality) has already been empirically shown to be historically relative: A psychology so abstract as to be eternal would not be useful for understanding real experience.

Those examples of psychological change over time are matched by equally profound differences across cultures. In her study of the self in Maori culture, Smith (1981) wrote:

> If the individual in Maori ideology was subject to many conditions and forces, so too was his

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experience considered to be largely outside his personal control. This was particularly true of unwanted experience. For the most part suffering was not thought to originate within a person, but to be an attack upon him, often by spirits angered by some violation of tapu" (p. 149).

Examples of such experiences include: _hauhauitu_ (languid cold or trembling, used in situations in which we would attribute fear or jealousy); and _hae_ (to be torn; used for jealousy or hate). As well as being construed as the result of invasion by evil spirits, they were also considered to be omens, in effect, messages warning of impending trouble. On the other hand, _aroha_ (love coloured by grief, yearning or pity) was considered to be caused by the intrusion of the loved one's spirit. The consequence of this attribution of emotions to external agents is that these feelings were not dealt with mentally, but ritually.

The importance of the Maori view of the self for phenomenology is not in the Maori _theory_ that spirits cause emotions (although they do hold this theory), but in the Maori _experience_ of these emotions as impinging on the self rather than evolving out of it. "It was not the 'self' which encompassed the experience, but experience which encompassed the self...This Maori experience compared with our own was impersonal and objective" (Smith, p. 152).

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Also relevant here is the way in which the classification of affect for the Maori expressed in their mental terms cuts across that of English, so that the same word can be used for 'jealousy' or 'hate' (as we would call them), but another for 'jealousy' or 'fear', and so on. This shows that Maori experience falls into kinds different from the kinds into which ours falls.

In another example, the experience of romantic love has been shown to be a culturally specific phenomena, in which "component processes of an emotional syndrome are given coherence and meaning by culturally provided exemplars" (Averill, 1985, p. 107). This quotation draws particular attention to the way in which culture actually contributes to the constitution of emotional experience. Studies of experience in various cultures have disclosed many distinct forms of experience, such as the Japanese concepts of <u>amae</u>, (Doi, 1974) and <u>on</u> (Lebra, 1969).

Gergen has drawn attention to the fact that the science of psychology is itself a form of cultural participation; its own theories are cultural artifacts and therefore subject to historical flux (1984, p. 12). Gergen introduced this argument in the context of showing that the science of psychology does not represent an unchanging order. "Folk psychology", the ordinary psychological theory of most of the people in a culture, is equally subject to temporal flux. In fact, Gergen (1987) has argued more recently that

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psychological explanations are actually "self-contained," that is, the sense of the terms of a psychological system come not from reference to actual experiences but from reference to other psychological terms.

This point has profound implications. Because folk psychology is itself subject to flux, and because much of our experience is actually constituted by inferences based on folk psychology, these experiences so constituted are themselves subject to historical flux and cultural contingency. For example, in the case of romantic love, it is the lovers' folk psychology which informs, and thereby partially constitutes their experience. A similar process takes place in Windigo psychosis, in which the concept of a supernatural cannibal, originally derived from myth, is applied to the disordered and antisocial behaviour of the afflicted individual, both by himself and others (Bishop, 1975). Thus, psychological phenomena are highly ephemeral. First, they are directly subject to historical and temporal flux. Second, psychological phenomena are partially constituted by the subject's own indigenous psychology which is itself a cultural product.

To explain how the psychological theory held by an individual influences his experience, Heelas (1981), in <u>Indigenous Psychology</u> has suggested that in each culture a theory of the self performs the function of orienting the person by specifying stances toward the self, objects,

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space, time, norms, and motives. To the extent that there are many self-theories by which a culture could perform this function, variations in the nature of the self are produced. Heelas' theory is similar to that of G. H. Mead, and will be discussed further below.

It might be objected at this point that it is the individual's beliefs, not his experience which is influenced by his folk psychology. This view of experience is exemplified by Rogerianism with its distinction between "organismic experience" and "intensionality", and assumes an experiential difference between immediate experience and beliefs concerning this experience (Meador & Rogers, 1984). However, experience, particularly in social situations, concerns meanings which are attributed to events rather than the sensory features of those events. This attribution of meaning is largely culturally constituted. (Gergen, 1982). Therefore, the experience of any social event presupposes culturally guided attribution of meaning: It is largely theoretical. There is little or no "organismic experience" in the social sphere. Also, beliefs themselves have been the topic of a significant portion of psychological studies in the areas of persuasion, conformity, cognitive dissonance, prejudice, etcetera. Therefore, if culture is a factor in belief, these phenomena are inherently contingent.

Implications of the Contingency of Psychological Phenomena for Present Research Methods in CPP

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The historical and cultural relativity of phenomena is an important objection to a priori methods in both HPP and CPP. Obviously, this variability violates the premise that there are universal structures for all experiences. This is devastating methodologically. An a priori psychology assumes that the structures of experiences are necessary; it is this necessity which must be intuited to discriminate acceptable and unacceptable variants in the free imaginative variation, and to bring this free imaginative variation to a close with a clear hold on the essence. But if the structure of phenomena are culturally variable, then they are not universal. If they are not universal then they are not necessary. And if they are not necessary, then the imaginative variation is not an valid technique for psychology.

This is the reason that the defence that an essence can be intuited for a specific range of phenomena, e.g., a particular social context, (Andrew, 1985, 1986), is inadequate. Intuition rests on necessity, and necessity entails universality. One cannot intuit that a certain structure of experience is characteristic of, for example, contemporary American females, because the basis of the generalization involved even in this eidetic intuition would be necessity, and this necessity would contradict the contingency implied by restricting the conclusions to this social group. To put this objection in concrete terms, if it is possible for non-American females to have an

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experience which does not accord with the structure a researcher describes, it is equally possible for an American female to have such an atypical experience.

Historical and cultural variation in psychological phenomena pose an insurmountable problem for a priori phenomenological psychology, as Husserl suspected they might. However, to be fair to phenomenological psychology and to put this criticism in a larger perspective, it must be noted that the same problem is found in mainstream empirical psychology. It also has failed to deal with the historical and cultural variability of psychological laws. Most research has been limited to North Americans and Western Europeans, particularly university students, and many theories contain terms which refer exclusively to Western society and culture. In fact this problem is somewhat less severe in phenomenological psychology, where existential influence has caused the recognition from the outset, at least theoretically, that experience is historically situated (Chapter 2).

To summarize the arguments of this chapter so far, three broad types of problems have been raised with respect to the a priori knowledge of essences: (1) those which originate from the intrinsic difficulties of Husserlian phenomenology; (2) those which originate from departures from Husserlian rigour in a priori methods; and (3) those which originate in the historically and temporally contingent and theoretically

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constituted nature of psychological phenomena.

As was shown in chapters One, Two, and Three, CPP has supplanted, or in some cases augmented, rational methods with empirical methods: The most frequently cited methodological papers reviewed in Chapter Two modelled research procedures involving the collection of accounts of experiences from voluntary participants. Of the 24 studies reviewed in Chapter Three, 17 relied heavily on inductive research involving participants other than the psychologist; the remainder all made some use of anecdotes, the empirical research of other experimenters, or other less formal types of a posteriori evidence.

Several of the problems already discussed with respect to the a priori knowledge of essences in phenomenological psychology apply equally to the a posteriori knowledge of essences: Particularly significant here is the problem of the historical and cultural impermanence of psychological phenomena. Just as the variability of psychological phenomena prevents a priori intuition of necessary, universal structures of experience, it also prevents generalization of inductive findings beyond the melieu in which they were obtained.

This problem is exacerbated by the poor representativeness of samples used in empirical phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology. Typically, CPP researchers have used samples restricted to North Americans,

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most often university students. Of the studies reviewed in Chapter Three, only two used participants selected from a range of occupational, age, and gender groups. None used a sample from outside of North America (Chapter Three).

In some cases, researchers qualified their conclusions by indicating that they apply only to North Americans. This does not entail the same logical difficulties as does the attempt to apply free imaginative variation to culturally constituted phenomena. However, the use of such a limited group of subjects does raise the same problem which plagues mainstream empirical psychology, that is, the failure to employ representative samples. This reduces generalizability, and undermines the reader's confidence that the findings reflect necessity, or anything akin to it. A psychology which attempts to describe the experience of only a small portion of society (young adults in psychology courses) is trivial. Also given that the small proportion of the citizens who attend university and become participants in such research are relatively privileged members of a relatively privileged society, such a psychology could also be called elitist.

The most severe and explicit form of under-induction is the deliberate restriction of a study to subjects who can be expected to have had similar experiences in order to make it more likely that a pattern will emerge. For example, in her study on the experience of the premenstruum, Jill Drapkin

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Montgomery purposely limited her subjects to "seven women...all Caucasion, none had children, none used birth control pills, all were between the ages of 24 and 30, all were psychotherapists at graduate or postdoctoral levels of training" (p. 46).

Equally problematic logically is the tendency to take an aspect of a phenomenon as essential even though it is not typical even of all of the subjects in a study. This is the case when an "inclusive description" is presented which contains every theme found in the experience of any subject. It is also exemplified when researchers take those elements which are transituational to be essential, even if they are not present in every instance.

Delimiting Possible Psychological Universals In Relation to the Methods of CPP

It has been shown in the first half of this chapter that at least some experiences are culturally constituted. However, this does not entail the notion that the structure of every kind of experience is culturally specific. The proportion of psychological phenomena whose structures are contingent rather than necessary has not yet been established. The identification of possible psychological universals is doubly important for phenomenological psychology. First, it is important for a priori methods: It is not possible for the researcher to assume that a reflective descriptions of his or her own experience is applicable to the experience of

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others unless some universals govern experience. Second, it is important for a posteriori methods: Evidence that certain areas of psychological phenomena have universal structures implies that researchers may generalize findings in those areas beyond the sample under examination. In order to clarify the boundary between general and specific forms of experience, if such a boundary exists, possible sources of contingency will be discussed, then possible sources of necessity.

To review the examples discussed above, it has been shown that the experience of the self, of fear, anger, envy, grief, love, and childhood, are subject to cultural variation. These topics have certain elements in common. Notably, they involve "higher" cognitive processes such as interpretation to some degree, as opposed to other "lower" processes such as reflexes. Also, each is interpersonal to some degree. This is most obvious in the cases of anger, envy, grief, love, and attributions, but, recall that in the example of fear in the Maori, spirits introduced an interpersonal element. The experience of being a child is also interpersonal in so far as it includes the ascription by adults to the child of an infantile role.

From the viewpoint of G. H. Mead, (1931) and subsequent symbolic interactionists, these are exactly the types of phenomena which ought to be culturally contingent. Mead regarded the self as an artifact of culture. The possession

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of a self, and the awareness of it, is produced through social interaction, especially language. According to this view, initially an individual is conscious (of the world) but not yet self-consciousness, that is, she cannot take herself as an object of perception.

The simplest form of communication, which humans share with many animals, is the gesture. The importance of the gesture is that it is an action which is completed by another. The completion is the meaning of the act. Speech is the significant form of gesture, that is, each term stands for a class of objects. In order to affect the behaviour of others, the child calls out a response in them through speech. Because speech, unlike some other gestures, is auditory, it is readily perceptible to the person making the gesture: She "knows what she is talking about." Because the symbols of speech are always universals, these at least potentially refer also to herself, and can call out a similar response. Both the gesture and its completion then are available to the individual, allowing her to control the action with reference to its consequences, that is, through its meaning. This ability, for Mead, consituted mind. Therefore thinking is a kind of internalized speech. This process culminates when the child takes the speech she initially directed at others and speaks to herself (initially aloud and later silently) and about herself. To do so is to take the self as an object, that is, to be self-conscious.

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This process of self-direction through internalized speech and internalized roles is particularly salient in make-believe play, in which the child takes on various roles, one at a time, and in games, in which the child must take on the attitude of all of the other players. As well as requiring the child to take on a role, these tasks also require the child to take on the perspective of several other agents relative to her own role, and thereby take herself as an object, that is, be self-conscious.

Later accounts of the development of experience and the ability to reflect on that experience offered by symbolic interactionists and allied schools such as cultural psychology (Vygotsky, 1978) ethogeny (Harre & Secord, 1973) social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1980) and indigenous psychology (Heelas & Locke, 1981) retain some or all of the key features of the Mead view: (1) The meaning of events and objects is determined by concepts which orgainize experience. These are transmitted to the individual from the society through culture, especially language; that is, experience is seldom, if ever, "raw." (2) Social experiences are conspicuously subject to culturally mediated interpretation because: (a) The form and content of many social phenomena are culturally transmitted, e.g., role, rules, rituals, dramas, games; (b) The meanings of these events to the participants are bestowed on them by the participants involved according to cultural norms. Entities which convey such systems of meaning include folk

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psychologies, religions, etcetera. (3) These meanings entail corresponding types of experience. Both the potential for and content of self-consciousness are linked to symbolic interaction.

As language, social roles, rules, and rituals vary from culture to culture, these norms, and the self which they constitute, vary accordingly. For example, differences in attribution patterns in America and India can be traced to the difference between the relatively voluntaristic ideology of the U.S.A. and the karmic religion of the Indians the researcher interviewed (Miller, 1984). Historical social psychology and emic cross-cultural psychology have typically concerned themselves with these interpersonal aspects of mental life, closely related to moral discourse, social roles, etcetera. (e.g., Gergen, 1984; Heelas, 1981).

It becomes apparent then that phenomenological psychologists have often made inappropriate choices for the topics of their research given the methods which they have employed. Those issues related to the self and interpersonal interaction have been the most frequent topics for research (see Chapter Three). Yet they are the very ones which seem to be culturally contingent and therefore lack a "definite manifold". To put this criticism in Husserlian terms, the phenomenological reduction, if rigorously applied to the most popular topics of CPP, reduces them out of coherence or possibility. The reason

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for this is that the constituents of interpersonal experience are exactly the culturally received causal, realist, assumptions which the phenomenological reduction seeks to suspend.

This view of the source of the contingency of the structure of experience agrees with the critical assessments of particular studies in this thesis. Little fault has been found here with a priori studies of "lower", relatively private mental phenomena, such as spatial perception (Husserl, 1977/1962), and imagination and memory (van den Berg, 1975). Similarly, no problems have been identified here with empirical studies of such phenomena. For example, Rosen's (1974) study of non-Euclidean vision and Moustgaard's (1963) study of autokinesis demonstrated several reliable, non-realist features of these experiences which previous experimental work had not disclosed. On the other hand, those studies which produced descriptions to which counter-examples could readily be proposed dealt with interpersonal experience with obvious "higher" cognitive components (e.g., Alapack and Alapack, 1984). These problems were avoided by cross-cultural approaches to the study of experience of this kind. For example, Smith's (1981) study of comparing negative affect among the Maori with that of North American and Europeans corrects Fischer's empirical study of anxiety among North American's by illuminating the role of indigenous psychology determining the experienced origin of the experience. This pattern of

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success and failure in CPP shows that the criticisms raised in this thesis are not merely theoretical, but have definite implications for the appropriate method to be adopted in any study of experience, and its probable reliability.

Up to this point, this chapter has been primarily critical, that is, the effort here has been to show that little support exists in either HPP or CPP to justify the methodology it employs, and that instead there is a real basis for the contingency of experience, particularly interpersonal experience and experience of the self. But not all psychological phenomena are of this kind. The problem is to clarify which aspects of experience are general, and which are culturally specific. The following section is intended to be constructive: some considerations for identifying the domains in which generalizations about experience might legitimately be made, using both a posteriori and a priori methods, will be outlined.

Given that it is interpersonal experience which seems to be culturally specific, it is possible that more personal, less complex kinds of experience do have general structures. The problem of psychological universals, including the question of what degree of abstraction they actually occur at, what would constitute evidence for them and what they might include, has a large literature associated with several disciplines. It is not the purpose of the present discussion to settle this issue, but only to point out its

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implications for phenomenological psychology.

Surveying the literature of cross-cultural psychology, Lonner (1980) considered four disciplines which might provide psychological universals: anthropology, biology, linguistics, and psychology. To these must can be added philosophy, in which Husserl, Kant, Heidegger, and others have implicitly or explicitly defended experiential, cognitive, and existential universals. Lonner applied the taxonomy of universals proposed by Jaynes and Bressler (1971) to universals proposed in these disciplines. This taxonomy includes: (1) simple behavioural universals, such as facial expressions; (2) variform universals, in which two or more behaviours have the same function, and some specific elements in common, such as mating behaviour; (3) functional universals, which have similar social consequences but may be configured differently, such as rites of passage; (4) diachronic universals, which remain the same as behaviour changes through time, such as the laws of of learning; (5) relational universals, in which one behaviour implies or excludes another, for example, if a species has a vocal signal, then it will also have a warning cry.

However, as was noted with regard to Schlenker's response to Gergen, in order to be useful for phenomenological psychology, universals must be found at some level of abstraction appropriate to the description of experience. The detection of a psychological necessity at some level of

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abstraction does not entail a corresponding general phenomenological structure. For example, while each culture specifies an orien ation of the self with respect to norms, this orientation is experienced in ways which vary enormously from culture to culture. In fact, many universals discussed by cross-cultural psychologists and anthropologists are instantiated in radically different ways, so that they are "behind" rather than within experience. For example, the Maori and Europeans both acknowledge something like fear, but they experience it in ways which leave very little of interest in common. Consequently, while some theorists have focussed primarily on these abstract universals and concluded that "radical cultural relativism is seems outmoded," (Munroe & Munroe, 1980) this must presently be taken to apply to theories about behaviour, and not to descriptions of experience.

Another aspect of the controversy on universals which is crucial for phenomenology is the emic/etic distinction. An emic research stradegy is one in which the researcher studies behaviour using concepts derived from within the culture under consideration. An etic research strategy uses concepts from outside the culture under consideration in order to compare two or more cultures. The concepts derived from these strategies are also referred to as "emic" or "etic". An imposed etic or pseudoetic strategy is one which assumes without evidence that a particular concept is etic, for example when a researcher applies a psychological test

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standardized in one culture to another culture without assessing its validity or reliability for the latter group (Triandis and Marin, 1983; Church and Katigbak, 1988).

CPP attempts to study experience as it is given to the subject: it seeks to avoid imposing the researcher's biases on experiences, and ideally permits the participant to describe an experience in his own words and retains as much of this as possible in the general description of that experience. Therefore, in the case of phenomenological psychology, it is necessary to derive concepts emically. While this argument is epistemic, it has correlates in the experience of the subject.

A second reason that the concepts must be emically derived is that the identification of any act or experience involves reference to its meaning. As has been indicated earlier, this meaning is not reducible to any physical features of the act (Gergen, 1984). Therefore, the researcher must inquire about its meaning. The concepts that the agent employs in her explanation will be of the emic kind, and so the resercher must employ these. A simple aspect of this is the construal of that experience as being of a certain type. Therefore the subject's folk psychology, which is his taxonomy of experiences, is important for understanding the connotations of that experience for the subject. This in itself does not obligate the researcher to use solely emic concepts: In some cases the researcher may

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find similarities across cultures which permit him to construct etic descriptions. However, these must be derived through emic strategies.

Based on these considerations, in identifying possible universal of experience, the following considerations would be among those which are useful: (1) Phenomena which have already been shown to be contingent on indigenous psychologies are to be avoided. That includes both specific phenomena which have been shown to be unstable, such as romantic love, and others which involve attributions to the self and others. (2) Simple and variform universals are to be preferred. Among these, universals which appear to be experiential as well as behavioural will be preferred. Proposed universals of the functional, diachronic, and relational type, especially those which are stated at a high enough level of abstraction not to refer to experience, will be avoided, since they each would not necessarily imply a phenomenological correlate. (3) Proposed domains of universals for which some empirical evidence already exists will be preferred. (4) Proposed domains of universals for which some underlying cause exists will be preferred, e.g., because any experiences innate in humans can also be expected to be necessary and universal, the heritibility of a form of behaviour would justify a phenomenological inquiry, possibly even an a priori one, into its general experiential correlate.

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Recommendations for the Practice of CPP

Before concluding, it is important to note that the arguments presented here for the revision of the methodology of phenomenological psychology to reduce essentialism apply equally to the methodological behaviourism of mainstream psychological research. While empirical psychology, with a posteriori rather than a priori methods, has had the means at its disposal to recognize the cultural contingency of psychological phenomena, it has for the most part failed to do so. Most research has been done using undergraduate psychology students, a very unrepresentative sample, as subjects. Also, it has generally neglected the study of experience and of articulated materials in favour of the study of "behaviour" under "controlled conditions."

These are some implications of the material discussed above:

(1) Researchers should refrain from the initial assumption that each social and psychological term from a theoretical or "folk" psychology denotes a natural kind, that is, a group of phenomena with an essential structure common and unique to that group of phenomena. Terms should be considered to refer to essences only after initial conceptual and empirical investigation.

(2) Methodology ought always to be indicated in phenomenological reports. It should be clearly indicated whether a given description of an experience is based on a

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self- report, free imaginative variation, empathic insight, or the interpretation of an articulated product.

(3) Researchers should consider on what grounds a phenomenon might be considered essential, that is, whether or not there is some underlying biological (or possibly spatial, temporal, logical or existential) structure to support its universality.

(4) *A priori* techniques should assume a Husserlian rigour, with both the phenomenologically reduced assumptions and the variants of the eidetic reduction indicated. They should be directed primarily at phenomena which appear to be constituted by one of the underlying structures mentioned above, and not to be culturally constituted.

(4) *A posteriori* techniques using small samples of participants might be successfully used to study experiences which appear to be constituted by one of the underlying structures named above, and not to be culturally specific, that is, to have little interpersonal or cognitive content.

(5) Cross-cultural and historical data should be employed in order to determine the degree of cultural specificity of each experience. Deliberately limiting samples to artificially generate a common structure is unacceptable.

<u>Summary of this Chapter</u>

In critically comparing CPP to HPP, it was noted that two

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groups of problems have arisen in CPP. The first kind of problem originates in the similarity CPP to HPP with respect to the use of a priori methods. Neither Husserl nor contemporary phenomenological psychologists have made a thorough argument for essences underlying psychological phenomena and discernible to intuition, nor does such an argument seem likely to emerge. The second kind of problem originates in the dissimilarity of CPP to HPP with respect to the use of a priori methods. Unlike Husserl, CPP researchers generally do not demonstrate rigour in their use of eidetic intuition. The third kind of problem, which applies to HPP, and to both a priori and a posteriori methods in CPP is that historical and cross-cultural research, consistent with symbolic interactionist theoretical arguments, reveal the cultural contingency of psychological phenomena. This is contrary to the pervasive essentialism of phenomenological psychology. In order to remedy these problems, the inclusion of cross-cultural and historical data in the study of experience is urged.

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Appendix A: Sample Content Analysis Form

Reference:

(1) Type of Article: (a) philosophical (b) expository (c) methodological (d) historical (e) psychological (f) other

(2) Goal: (a) testing a hypothesis (b) answering a question (c) describing a phenomenon

(2) Approach: (a) phenomenological (b) phenomenological-hermeneutic (c) existential-phenomenological (d) empirical (e) introspection (f) other

(3) Metaphysics & Ontology: (a) essentialism (b) Heidiggerian ontological categories (c) intentionality (d) subject-object unity (e) lebenswelt, ontic primacy of (f) rejection of mathematical idealism (g) dialectic (h) idealism (i) uniqueness of man

Source:.

(4) Epistemological Commitments: (a) to the things, fidelity to phenomena (b) concreteness (c) intersubjectivity of knowledge (d) anti-reduction (e) holism (f) rejection of analysis (g) theoretical openness (h) bracketing of assumptions (i) construction of concepts ad hoc (j) other

Source:

(5) Methodological Beliefs: (a) researcher's intentions (b) researcher's presence (c) researcher's expectations (d) subject's

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interpretation of context (e) subject's motives (f) subject's state (g) realism of phenomena, non-artificialism (i) empathic awareness (j) primacy of subject as interpreter (k) holism re phenomena (l) holism re subject (m) other

Source:

(6) Anthropological Commitments: (a) uniqueness of man

(7) Subject Matter: (a) subject's experience (b) meaning for subject (c) subject's lived sense (d) subject's expression of meaning (bodily/verbal) (e) functional significance (f) behaviour (g) other

Source

(8) References to Prior Research: ("+" means laudatory, "-" means critical) (a) Phenomenological psychology (b) phenomenological philosophy (c) mainstream psychology (d) other

(9) Research Context: (a) wholly a priori (b) researcher's experience (past, present) (c) interview (structured, unstructured, non-directive) (d) field observation (e) participant observation (f) clinical observation (g) laboratory experiment (h) experiment debriefing (i) S's account (j) other

(10) Research Method: (a) phenomenological reduction (b) eidetic reduction (c) free imaginative variation (d) observation (e) ex post facto design (f) introspection (g) reader's experience (h) noetic-noematic structures

Source:

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(10b) Content Analysis: (a) screening material (b) initial reading for sense (c) exhaustive analysis (d) reading for themes at first step (e) eliminating redundancy (f) eliminating irrelevance (g) grouping statements across Ss (h) summarizing Ss account (i) summarizing general themes (j) review by Ss (k) other Source:

(11) Recording: (a) interview transcript (b) written account (c) tape recording (d) notes behaviour with interview (e) other

(12) Operations/Reflections Performed: (a) intuiting essences (b) reflecting (c) imaginative listening (d) interpretation (e) qualitative analysis (f) philosophical analysis (g) finding unity (i) categorizing (j) dialoging

(13) Result of Operations: (a) intuiting (essence, structure) (b) description of experience (c) description of behaviour (d) explanation of experience (e) explanation of behaviour (f) other

(14) Generalization: (a) none (b) some (c) complete

(15) Interpretation/Discussion: (a) in isolation (b) phenomenologicl psychology (c) phenomenological philosophy (d) mainstream pscyhology (e) other

Notes:

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Appendix B:

Twenty-Four Pher omenological Psychogical Studies

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Fischer, W. T. (1973) On the phenomenological mode of researching "being anxious." _Journal of Phenomenological Psychology_, _4_, 405-423.

Rosen, S. M. (1974). A case of non-Euclidian vision. _Journal of Phenomenological Psychology_, _5_, 33-39.

van den Berg, J. H. (1975). Have you seen the pantheon ? _Journal of Phenomenological Psychology_, _6_, 153-163.

Yonge, G. D. (1975). A dynamic image of masculine and feminine movement. _Journal of Phenomenological_

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Collier, G & Kuiken, D. (1977). A phenomenological study of the experience of poetry. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 8, 209-225.

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Spitzer, S. P. (1977). Ontological insecurity and the reflective process. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 8, 203-216.

Faber, S., Nilakantan, N., Rothmeier, R. & Zapf, C. (1978). Experiential aspects and styles of group decision-making. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 8, 136-163.

Frank, A. W. III (1978). Anxiety aroused by the dying: A phenomenological inquiry. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 9, 99-113.

Arcaya, J. M. (1979). A phenomenology of fear. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 10, 165-188.

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Osbourne, J. W. & Kennedy, L. (1985). An empirical validation of Schopenauer's theory of music through analysis of listener's experience of Mahler's Ninth Symphony. _Journal of Phenomenological Psychology_, _16_, 13-38.

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Dolis, J. (1986). Expression and silence: The responsibility of language/The language of responsibility, *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, *17*, 33-41.

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Appendix C: Sources of Methodological Prescriptions in Contemporary Phenomenological Psychology

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Andrew, W. K. (1985). The phenomenological foundation for empirical methodology I: The method of optional variations. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 16, 1-29.

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Sardello, R. J. (1971b). The role of direct experience in contemporary psychology-A critical review. In A. Giorgi, W. F. Fisher, & R. von Eckartsberg (Eds.), Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology, (Vol. 1, 30-49). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

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